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1.

INTRODUCTION

It would be difficult to envision Thomas Bruce as a Greek. Bruce, the
Scotsman better known as the Seventh Earl of Elgin, is now famous (to some,
infamous) as the namesake of the Elgin Marbles in the British Museum. From
t
Law Clerk, the Honorable Jeffrey R. Howard, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit;
Harvard Law School, J.D. 2009; University of Cambridge, M.Phil. 2006; Harvard College, A.B. 2005. 1
am grateful to Roger Alford, Yochai Benkler, Terry Martin, Joseph Singer, Jeannie Suk, and Cara Suvall
for helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors are my own.
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1799 to 1803, he served as British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in
Constantinople. In 1801, after receiving permission from the Ottoman
government, he began removing marble friezes from the Acropolis, then in
danger of destruction due to the ongoing Greek War of Independence. In an
effort to preserve the friezes, Lord Elgin had them shipped home to Britain,
where he would eventually sell them to the British government. Two hundred
years later, this "expatriation" of the Greek sculptures has provided the
ideological battleground par excellence in the debate over the proper home of
items of cultural property.'
But imagine for a moment that Lord Elgin had been a native of Greece,
equally concerned about the safety of the sculptures. What if, rather than
loading the sculptures on ships bound for London, he had merely carted them
off to some other region of the Greek isles? Consider what the ensuing
cultural property dispute might have looked like. As the years went by, would
Athenians have begun to call for "repatriation" of their cultural property as
vociferously as they do now from Britain? Would Greeks from outside
Athens? Would non-Greeks? Should non-Greeks?
The premise is, of course, completely fantastical. But there is a
corrective purpose to this thought experiment. In thinking about cultural
property, we have grown accustomed to picturing the competing interests
as aligning along different sides of international borders.2 Concededly, that
reaction is a natural one. Cultural property was first recognized as a distinct
concept in the context of wartime plunder,3 and its earliest protection under
I.

The literature on the Elgin Marbles is vast. For some of the most influential commentary,

see John Henry Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1881 (1985); John

Henry Merryman, Whither the Elgin Marbles?, in IMPERIALISM, ART AND RESTITUTION 98 (John Henry
Merryman ed., 2006); and David Rudenstine, Lord Elgin and the Ottomans: The Question of
Permission, 23 CARDozo L. REV. 449 (2002). The Marbles have also generated the most visible
diplomatic dispute over cultural property. In 1999, 339 of the 626 members of the European Parliament

formally asked Britain to return the Marbles to Greece. See Lawrence Van Gelder, PropertyRites, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 1999, at El. Britain does not seem to be budging. See The British Museum, The
Parthenon Sculptures, http://www.thebritishmuseum.ac.uk/gr/debate.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2010);
see also Parthenon Marbles, http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/parthenon
2010) (collecting sources).

(last visited Mar. 27,

As to the term cultural property, Patty Gerstenblith has defined it as "those objects that are the
product of a particular group or community and embody some expression of that group's identity,
regardless of whether the object has achieved some universal recognition of its value beyond that
group." Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and CulturalProperty: The Protection of CulturalProperty in the
United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 569-70 (1995). While some have made a deliberate distinction
between the terms "cultural property" and "cultural heritage," I use the two terms here interchangeably.

2.

For example, one author has defined repatriation of cultural property as "a return topatria,

which means fatherland understood as a State." Wojciech Kowalski, Repatriation of CulturalProperty
Following a Cession of Territory or Dissolution of MultinationalStates, 6 ART, ANTIQUITY & L. 139,
163 (2001). Similarly, UNESCO's primary goal in the field of cultural property is "to build up
cooperation between countries." LYNDEL V. PROTT & PATRICK J. O'KEEFE, HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL
REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE EXPORT OF CULTURAL PROPERTY, at i (1988). And the leading
casebook on art law has stated that the "[tihe premise.. . that cultural property belongs at the place, or
among the descendants of the culture, of its origin .... translates in most cases into the claim that the
nation that today includes that geographic area, or whose people are descendants of that culture,

rightfully should possess the objects." JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL
ARTS 342 (5th ed. 2007) (emphasis added). In other words, cultural objects belong in their nation of
origin. To the extent disputes arise, they are between that nation and foreign entities.
3.
The Greek historian Polybius condemned the Roman tradition of cultural spoliation in the
following terms:
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4
international law was only during episodes of international armed conflict.
Today, high-profile court cases usually involve allegedly looted objects
from a foreign state5 or expropriation from an alien national. 6 The leading
multilateral treaties on ownership of cultural property envision claims by or
against state actors. 7 And to the extent that commentators have critiqued that
system, they still do so within the context of international conflict. 8 In short,
the most visible milestones in the history of cultural property law suggest that
repatriation is necessarily a cross-border transaction.
Yet the sovereign state is not always the basic unit of "culture" in
cultural property, and disputes over patrimony do not always begin as
international affairs. Some cultural property disputes revolve around the
state's expropriation of objects from its own nationals. Others involve
regional disagreement over the precise location of objects already within the
territory of a particular state. In these intranational cases, both the state and a
local group assert mutually exclusive cultural patrimony over the same
property. The competing claimants over these cultural objects do not need to
travel far to reach one another. They don't even need a passport.
For many, discussion of intranational conflict over cultural property will
inevitably turn to the subject of indigenous group rights. Struggles between

indigenous communities and the Western settler communities that displaced
them have led to the enactment of major domestic repatriation statutes
targeted at native populations in antiquity-rich countries such as the United
States 9 and New Zealand.10 These conflicts and the resulting legislative
responses have thus far provided the exception to the otherwise exclusively
international trope of cultural property law and the only significant locus of

One may perhaps have some reason for amassing gold and silver; in fact, it would be
impossible to attain universal dominion without appropriating these resources from other
peoples, in order to weaken them. In the case of every other form of wealth, however, it
is more glorious to leave it where it was, together with the envy which it inspired, and to
base our country's glory, not on the abundance and beauty of its paintings and statues,
but on its sober customs and noble sentiments. Moreover, I hope that future conquerors
will learn from these thoughts not to plunder the cities subjugated by them, and not to
make the misfortunes of other peoples the adornments of their own country.
International Protection of Works of Art and Historic Monuments, in 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
DOCUMENTS AND STATE PAPERS 821, 823 (1949) (quoting Polybius's History of the Roman Republic).
4.
See Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Intentional Destruction of CulturalHeritage and International
Law, in MULTICULTURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 377, 380 (2007) (listing early sources).

5.
See, e.g., Elisabetta Povoledo, Prosecutors Bet Big on Antiquities Trial in Italy, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at El.
6.
See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (analyzing Nazi
confiscation of a Czech national's property).
7.
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 96 Stat. 2350, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter
1970 UNESCO Convention]; UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects,
June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1330 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention]. The monopoly of authority that
these instruments confer on state actors is discussed in detail in Section II.B.
8.
See, e.g., Kwame Anthony Appiah, Whose Culture Is It?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006,
at 38 (questioning the sense of Nigeria calling for repatriation of cultural artifacts from London and New
York when "[m]ost of Nigeria's cultural patrimony was produced before the modem Nigerian state
existed").
9.
See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013
(2006).
10. See Protected Objects Act 1975, 1975 S.R. No. 41 (N.Z.).
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scholarship on intranational repatriation."
But this focus on indigenism has obscured the fact that some
intranational disputes over cultural objects do not correspond to the
indigenous-community-versus-settler-community model. The distinction is
important. It is becoming increasingly apparent that international law accords
indigenous groups special rights vis-A-vis the state on whose territory they
reside. 12 Those rights provide an illuminating lens through which to view
questions concerning repatriation. Yet when cultural property disputes do not
fit the indigenous-versus-settler template, that lens becomes irrelevant. In this
sense, injecting indigenism into the discussion inevitably alters it. In those
scenarios where the particular needs and rights of indigenous groups are not at
issue, we must look elsewhere for guidance.
It is here where we find a gap in the scholarship. Outside the realm of
indigenous groups' rights, the intranational dimension of cultural property law
remains unfortunately undertheorized by academics and overlooked by
practitioners. There is simply no intranational equivalent of the Elgin Marbles
debates among scholars. Likewise, proponents of repatriation within the
archaeological community often default to returning unearthed antiquities to
state governments, failing to consider whether local communities would in
fact be more appropriate recipients. As Alexander Bauer recently observed,
"[m]any countries contain minority communities whose interests are not
always served by their national governments. Yet ...many [archaeologists]

remain largely supportive of efforts to repatriate objects in spite of these
concerns." 13 As we shall see, this statement may hold true whether or not any
history of colonialism marks the relationship between potential claimants.
11.

For examples of work that has been done on indigenous group rights in cultural objects,

see ANA FILIPA VRDOLJAK, INTERNATIONAL LAW, MUSEUMS AND THE RETURN OF CULTURAL OBJECTS
(2006); Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property, 72 IND. L.J. 723
(1997); and Symposium, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 and
State Repatriation-RelatedLegislation, 24 ARIZ.ST. L.J. 1 (1992). A related topic that has precipitated a

recent explosion of scholarship has been rights in intangible cultural heritage and traditional folklore
such as dance, images, and language. See, e.g., MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE?
(2004); INDIGENOUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: LEGAL OBSTACLES AND INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS

(Mary Riley ed., 2004).
12. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). The Declaration indicates that indigenous peoples have a right to
"cultural development," id.
Annex art. 3, "the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and
future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs,
ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature," id.Annex art. 11, "the right to
the use and control of their ceremonial objects," id.Annex art. 12, and "the right to the repatriation of
their human remains," id.
For a comprehensive discussion of the Declaration and other contributions to a
unique field of indigenous rights, see ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED
NATIONS STANDARDS: SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND (2007). See also Kimberly L.
Alderman, EthicalIssues in CulturalPropertyLaw Pertainingto Indigenous Peoples, 45 IDAHO L. REV.
515 (2009) (arguing that the plight of indigenous groups present special concerns for cultural property
policyrnakers); Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 118
YALE L.J. 1022, 1025 (2009) (referring to "the emergence of a distinct area of [property] law that

focuses on land, traditional knowledge, and other interests often associated with the cultural heritage of
indigenous groups"). In addition, nongovernmental organizations such as the World Archaeological
Congress have passed codes of ethics specifically applicable to indigenous groups. See The World
Archaeological Congress, World Archaeological Congress Codes of Ethics, http://www.world
archaeologicalcongress.org/site/about-ethi.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
13.
Alexander A. Bauer, New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical
Appraisalof the Antiquities Trade Debates, 31 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 690, 703 (2008).
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This Article, which highlights disputes occurring outside of the
indigenous context, is a first step toward filling the gap. I focus on a particular
question: how much should the international community care how precisely
the "home" of cultural objects is defined? The world could treat the "Greek
Elgin" hypothetical with which I began as a purely domestic matter. It might
reason that so long as the Marbles remain in Greece, it does not matter where
in specific they reside; the international community has no horse in that
cultural property race. Alternatively, it could articulate some principle that
would justify foreign involvement. It is that choice that I explore here.
I attempt to distill the international interest in intranational disputes from
the principles underlying our existing cultural property policies. By examining
what we are trying to accomplish when we apply principles of cultural
property law in international arenas, I hope to clarify just what is at stake
when we apply them in intranational ones. The answer, I conclude, ultimately
depends on the genesis of the conflict. We ought to proceed with a baseline
presumption of nonintervention, which would apply in many cases without
need for further analysis. This presumption, however, should not be universal.
When adhering to a laissez-faire policy would in fact undermine the very
reasons that we have come to recognize cultural property rights in the first
place, the cost of nonintervention rises. In these cases, when we have more to
lose, our sense of investment should run deeper.
My analysis begins in Part II by describing the state of international law
regarding how a state may choose to allocate its own cultural property. I first
review the traditional limits that territorial sovereignty places on foreign
involvement in a state's decisions regarding the property of its own citizens. I
then examine how the major international cultural property treaties assign
rights to state actors rather than subnational groups. I discuss how as a result
of these factors, citizens have historically never possessed any cultural
property rights at international law vis-A-vis their own government. I conclude
this Part by arguing that, despite this history, state actors may no longer have
such a monopoly on cultural property rights. As exemplified in the emerging
norm against the intentional destruction of cultural property, world opinion is
beginning to recognize that transnational cultural property norms can be
violated by intranational actions.
As a result, the international interest in preservation of cultural property
is increasingly circumscribing a state's interest in disposing of its own
property as it sees fit. But is a state similarly limited when physical
preservation is not at issue? The remainder of this Article introduces three
different case studies that explore the range of interests implicated by a state's
allocation of, rather than destruction of, its own cultural property. In Part III, I
present my argument for a default rule of nonintervention using the example
of the ongoing conflict in Scotland over the Saint Ninian's Isle Treasure. I
identify several justifications for letting disputes remain domestic matters.
In Part IV, I argue that this nonintervention principle loses viability
when the catalyst for the dispute is not regionalism, but a state's
discrimination against a minority group. This is particularly likely to be the
case when a community is dispossessed of property by an act of expropriation.
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I discuss the recent U.S. case Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian
Federation,14 in which the plaintiffs alleged that Russia had acquired cultural
property as part of a persecutory campaign. Then, through a close analysis of
relevant international treaties and U.N. General Assembly resolutions, I
examine the ethos of multiculturalism that underlies modem cultural property
law. I contend that honoring a claim of group ownership over a cultural object
acquired through persecution of minority communities would ultimately
undermine rather than advance multiculturalism. This frustration of purpose
gives the international community a significantly higher interest in the
outcome. I identify the equitable doctrine of abuse of rights as a mechanism
for precluding discriminatory groups from acquiring property rights in cultural
objects at the expense of the victims of that discrimination.
Part V discusses a middle ground where a history of discrimination
exists, but that history is in some way detached from the present dispute.
Examining the conflict in England over the Lindisfame Gospels, manuscripts
confiscated five hundred years ago by Henry VIII during his campaign against
the Catholic Church, I question whether all discriminatory expropriations of
cultural property implicate international interests to the same extent. I
conclude that they do not, and I provide several factors that need to be
considered in weighing the costs and benefits of international involvement.
II.

CULTURAL PROPERTY AND STATE-CENTRICITY

Historically, cultural property law has held far more sway over how to
deliver objects to their nations of origin than it has over how those nations are
supposed to handle the delivery once it arrives. The characteristic design of
repatriation agreements and export controls is to give complete control over
cultural objects to the national government, not to regulate downstream use.15
Moreover, states' claims of domestic jurisdiction over the property already
under their dominion typically preclude international scrutiny. 16 This statecentric power structure has prompted the observation that "local communities
may be among the least empowered players in the 'cultural property world'
currently in place."' 7 Yet recent developments in international law suggest
14. 528 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
15.
See Alexander A. Bauer et al., When Theory, Practice and Policy Collide, or Why Do
Archaeologists Support Cultural Property Claims?, in ARCHAEOLOGY AND CAPITALISM: FROM ETHICS
TO POLITICS 45, 52 (Y. Hamilakis & P. Duke eds., 2007) (arguing that even when repatriation is
appropriate, "the question arises whether return is all we should hope for or expect," and noting that, in
cases of a debated need for repatriation, the legal community ought to be "asking what kind of rights or
economic benefits might be forthcoming to neighboring communities upon the objects' return, and
pushing for such policies in exchange for archaeologists' support").
16. The international community may not intervene in matters that fall under a state's
domestic jurisdiction. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter ... ").In the cultural property context, as elsewhere, states rely on this concept as a
shield from international scrutiny of their domestic activities. See Francesco Francioni, Beyond State
Sovereignty: The Protectionof CulturalHeritageas a SharedInterest of Humanity, 25 MICH. J.INT'L L.
1209, 1220 (2004) (noting "the objection of 'domestic jurisdiction' so oflen invoked to preserve the
power monopoly of the sovereign State" over issues of cultural property preservation).
17.
Bauer, supra note 13, at 713 (quoting Lyndel V. Prott, The InternationalMovement of
Cultural Objects, 12 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 225, 228 (2005)).
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that this structure may be changing; the state's domestic jurisdiction no longer
appears to be absolute. This Part examines the rise and potential decline of the
monopoly of authority that the state has traditionally held over its own cultural
property. Section H.A discusses the limits that territorial sovereignty places on
international intrusion into domestic property regimes. Section II.B deals with
cultural property law specifically, describing the power that the major treaties
confer in state actors alone. Section II.C then turns to the monopoly's first
sign of erosion: the ascendance of an international norm against intentional
destruction. Finally, Section II.D takes stock of how the rise of this norm
might shed light on intranational cultural property conflicts that do not
directly implicate concerns over physical preservation.
A.

TerritorialSovereignty over Property

International law operates from a baseline presumption that the state
holds sovereign authority over property within its own territory. 18 While states
remain internationally responsible for certain injuries involving property
belonging to alien nationals,' 9 their decisions regarding their own nationals'
property have remained essentially internal affairs.20 As a result, if aliens are
short of a treaty obligation to
not involved, there is normally nothing
21
"internationalize" the state's decisions.
Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in
18.
InternationalLaw, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 280 (1982). In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,
Chief Justice Marshall summarized the principle of territorial sovereignty as follows: "The jurisdiction
of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would
imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that
sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction." 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 136 (1812).
19. See, e.g., Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13)
(holding that a state that expropriates an alien's property must provide compensation); Texaco Overseas
Petroleum Co./Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 3, 22 (Int'l Arb. Trib. 1977)
(explaining that a state's nationalization of private property "constitutes the exercise of an internal legal
jurisdiction but carries international consequences when such measures affect international legal
relationships in which the nationalizing State is involved"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (1987) (listing conditions under which a state is
internationally responsible for various economic injuries to aliens).
20. During the drafting of the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations, Louis Henkin argued
that property as a human right had attained the status of customary law only in respect to a state's
treatment of aliens, not of its own nationals. See Continuationof Discussion of Restatement of the Law,
ForeignRelations Law of the United States (Revised), Tentative Draft No. 3, 59 A.L.I. PROC. 189, 216,
212 (1982). His view ultimately prevailed. See Brice M. Clagett & Daniel B. Poneman, The Treatment
of Economic Injury to Aliens in the Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 INT'L LAW. 35,
57-58 (1988); see also Lea Brilmayer, InternationalLaw in American Courts: A Modest Proposal,100
YALE L.J. 2277, 2287 (1991) ("Human rights cases are different from expropriation cases in one
important respect: the claims against the foreign state may be brought by citizens of that state, rather
than by aliens.").
The right is usually presented as the absence of a prohibition: states have territorial
21.
sovereignty over their own nationals' property because international law has done nothing to diminish
the default assumption of domestic jurisdiction. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 738
(5th ed. 2003) (stating that when foreign elements are not involved, "it can hardly be denied that
nationalisation is a perfectly legitimate measure for a state to adopt and clearly not illegal as such under
international law"); Hans W. Baade, The Operationof ForeignPublic Law, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 429, 464
(1995) ("[T]he protection accorded by [a] state to the property rights of its own nationals and enterprises
is not subject to international law constraints. For like reasons, international law is not concerned with
the taking by the expropriating state of the property of its own nationals or enterprises.").
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The most extensive discussion of this principle can be found in
case law concerning expropriations. Both the European Court of Human
Rights and U.S. courts have repeatedly held that a state's expropriation of its
own nationals' property does not implicate any settled rule of international
law. 22 Below, I discuss each forum's case law regarding international law's
presumptive silence on domestic allocation of property.
1.

European Court of Human Rights

Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides that "[n]o one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the
general principles of international law." 23 This clause, which I refer to as the
General Principles Clause, has given the European Court of Human Rights
several opportunities to opine on just what international law may dictate
regarding intranational expropriation.
First, in the 1960 case Gudmundsson v. Iceland, 24 the European
Commission on Human Rights 25 was asked to consider whether a special
national tax on property owners with large holdings violated Protocol No. 1.
The Commission interpreted the General Principles Clause only to refer to
confiscation of foreign-owned property. 26 It reasoned that "measures taken by
a State with respect to the property of its own nationals are not subject to these
general principles of international law in the absence of a particular treaty
clause specifically so providing." 27 Any application of the Convention to
intranational activity would constitute
an "exten[sion]," which the contracting
28
parties had no intention of doing.
The European Court of Human Rights explored the issue in greater
detail two decades later in Lithgow v. United Kingdom.29 Once again called on
to interpret the applicability of the General Principles Clause to a domestic
nationalization, the Court held that "purely as a matter of general international
law, the[] principles in question apply solely to non-nationals."3 ° The Court
went on to observe that the distinction was normatively justifiable because
non-nationals would be "more vulnerable to domestic legislation."'', The
22. At least one other tribunal has made a similar pronouncement. See Texaco Overseas
Petroleum, 17 I.L.M. at 20 ("It is clear from an international point of view that it is not possible to
criticize a nationalization measure concerning nationals of the State concerned .... ").
23. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol 1,
art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
24. Gudmundsson v. Iceland, App. No. 511/59, 1960 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 394 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.).
25. From 1954 until 1998, individuals did not have direct access to the European Court of
Human Rights. Instead, one had to apply to the Commission, which would continue a meritorious case
in the Court on an individual's behalf.
26. Gudmundsson, 1960 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 422-24.
27. Id. at 424.
28. Id.
29.
102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986). For an in-depth treatment of this case, see R. Anthony
Salgado, Note, Protectionof Nationals' Rights to Property Under the European Convention on Human
Rights: Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 865 (1987).
30. Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 47.
31.
Id. at 48-49.
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Court also speculated that "different considerations may apply to nationals
and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for requiring
3
nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than non-nationals."
Whatever the normative underpinning, the Court left no doubt that, as a purely
descriptive matter, "the general principles of international law 33are not
applicable to a taking by a State of the property of its own nationals."
2.

U.S. Courts

Even more vocal on this issue have been U.S. federal courts called on to
interpret international law. The U.S. court system is particularly significant in
this context because its domestic jurisprudence makes it one of the most
attractive forums in which to litigate for the return of cultural objects to their
countries of origin. 34 Additionally, under the jurisdiction-granting provisions
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 35 federal courts are increasingly
adjudicating claims against foreign governments for the restitution of art and
antiquities allegedly expropriated in violation of international law." As a
result, the U.S. position regarding property rights under international law is
often critical for cultural property claimants.
In the 1937 case United States v. Belmont,37 the U.S. Supreme Court
refused to interfere with the Bolshevik nationalization of a Soviet citizen's
private property. The Court stated that "[w]hat another country has done in the
way of taking over property of its nationals ...is not a matter for judicial
consideration here. Such nationals must look to their own government for any
redress to which they may be entitled., 38 This principle, though not often
traced to Belmont, underlies all U.S. jurisprudence on intranational takings.
Thus, in De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua,39 the Fifth Circuit
refused to adjudicate a claim against Nicaragua's newly elected Sandinista
government, which had ordered its bank not to honor a check made out to the
plaintiff. The court held that "[w]hile takings of property without
compensation violate American public policy regardless of the nationality of
the property owner, they violate international law only where the property

32.
33.

Id.at 49.
Id.at 50.

34.

See Lawrence M. Kaye, Art Wars: The RepatriationBattle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.

79, 80-81 (1998) (noting that because of the common law rule preventing good faith purchasers from
obtaining title to stolen property, "a body of law favorable to the return of cultural property stolen from
foreign sovereigns has developed in the United States"); Carol Kino, Trading Places, SLATE, July 28,
2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2086136 (characterizing the United States as "one of the best
jurisdictions in the world in which to recover stolen art" and noting the large number of "especially
tough" bilateral agreements with other countries allowing foreign litigants to pursue their own illegal
export cases in U.S. courts).
35.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2006). While the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act strips U.S.
courts of subject matter jurisdiction over most claims against foreign states, claims that fall under any of
the statute's exceptions are permitted to go forward.
36. See Lauren Fielder Redman, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Using a "Shield"
Statute as a "Sword" for Obtaining FederalJurisdiction in Art and Antiquities Cases, 31 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 781, 782 (2008).
37.
38.

301 U.S. 324 (1936).
Id. at 332.

39.

770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 35:347

owner is an alien. ' 4° Similarly, in Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, the
Ninth Circuit stated that "[e]xpropriation by a sovereign state of the property
of its own nationals does not implicate settled principles of international
law. ' , 4 1 Comparable
statements are scattered throughout a host of other
42
decisions.
U.S. courts have made virtually no exception to this bright-line rule,
even when the expropriation at issue is part of a discriminatory campaign.4 3
That principle has been tested most vigorously in cases that have involved
Holocaust-era confiscations. In Dreyfus v. Von Finck, a former German
citizen sought restitution for the wrongful confiscation of his property in Nazi
Germany in 1938. 44 The Second Circuit rejected his claim because "violations
of international law do not occur when the aggrieved parties are nationals of
the acting state." 45 More recently, in Garb v. Republic of Poland, Polish
Holocaust survivors and their heirs brought a class action against the Republic
of Poland for expropriation of real estate in the Holocaust's aftermath.46
During the immediate postwar period, over a thousand Jews who had survived
the horrors of the Nazi regime were murdered by Poles in waves of anti40. Id. at 1397 n.17.
41.
912 F.2d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 1990).
42. See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 713 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (discussing the "consensus view" in the lower courts that no violation of international law
occurs for "expropriations of property belonging to a country's own nationals"); Beg v. Pakistan, 353
F.3d 1323, 1328 n.3 (1lth Cir. 2003) ("International law prohibits expropriation of alien property
without compensation, but does not prohibit governments from expropriating property from their own
nationals without compensation."); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85, 888 n.23 (2d Cir.
1980) (noting that, in contrast to the right of a citizen to be free from torture, "no consensus view
exist[s]" on whether the right to be free from the discriminatory and uncompensated taking of property
is a "fundamental right[]" conferred by international law "upon all people vis-a-vis their own
governments"); Wahba v. Nat'l Bank of Egypt, 457 F. Supp. 2d 721, 731 (E.D. Tex. 2006) ("The
expropriation exception does not apply ... to a foreign state's dealings with property owned by its own
nationals."); Bank Tejarat v. Varsho-Saz, 723 F. Supp. 516, 520 (C.D. Cal. 1989) ("While such an act
may offend our notions of justice ... the taking by a government of the property of one of its citizens,
located within its territory, does not constitute a violation of international law."); Guinto v. Marcos, 654
F. Supp. 276, 280 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 1986) ("While there is no consensus on what constitutes a violation of
the 'law of nations,' in one area there appears to be a consensus. A taking or expropriation of a foreign
national's property by his government is not cognizable under [28 U.S.C.] § 1350."); Jafari v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209, 215 (N.D. I11. 1982) ("It may be foreign to our way of life and
thought, but the fact is that governmental expropriation is not so universally abhorred that its prohibition
commands the 'general assent of civilized nations ....
' (quoting Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881)); F.
Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d
Cir. 1967).
43. See, e.g., Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing, in
the context of a Holocaust-related confiscation of artwork, that "the plaintiff cannot be a citizen of the
defendant country at the time of the expropriation, because expropriation by a sovereign state of the
property of its own nationals does not implicate settled principles of international law" (internal
quotation marks omitted)), aff'd, 541 U.S. 677; Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d
699, 711 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that Argentine military officers' expropriation of the plaintiff's real
property and family business was not a violation of international law despite clear evidence of religious
discrimination). The one case of which I am aware to suggest an exception is PresbyterianChurch of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., which held that "[w]hile expropriation or property destruction alone
may not violate the law of nations, . . . expropriation or property destruction, committed as part of a
genocide or war crimes, may violate the law of nations." 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). So
far, this position remains an outlier.
44.
534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
45. Id.at 31.
46. 440 F.3d 579 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Semitic violence. 47 Most of the remaining Jews fled Poland for their safety,

leaving behind their property and possessions. 48 The plaintiffs in Garb alleged
that the Polish state, in order to legitimize its subsequent nationalization of the
property, had deliberately mislabeled it as having been abandoned by Nazis
rather than Jews.49 The Second Circuit steered clear of the issue of whether a
discriminatory taking against a state's own nationals50 could ever violate
international law and decided the case on other grounds.
B.

The Centrality of the State in International Cultural Property
Treaties

The state's general exercise of sovereign authority over its nationals'
property goes only part of the way toward explaining its monopoly over
cultural objects. In addition, the international scheme for protection of cultural
property in particular accords the state a sacrosanct position. With no "czar"
"every country
able to adjudicate or enforce how art should be allocated,
5
continues to be authoritative within its own borders." '
The state-centric structure of international cultural property law is most
evident in the 1970 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
52
Property, the most influential cultural property treaty currently in force. The
preamble to the convention, which governs the illicit export of cultural
property, provides that "cultural propert constitutes one of the basic elements
of civilization and national culture." 5 3 Likewise, Article 4 speaks of "the
cultural heritage of each State." 54 Article 1 defines cultural property as

47. Garb v. Republic of Poland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 16, 17-18 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), affd, 440 F.3d
579 (2d Cir. 2006).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 18-19.
50.
Garb, 440 F.3d at 590; see also Freund v. Republic of France, 592 F. Supp. 2d 540, 555
n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Garb for uncertainty over whether discriminatory and uncompensated
taking of property is a fundamental right conferred by international law upon all people vis-h-vis their
own governments). Freund, a class action involving restitution claims for money and valuables
expropriated while class members were detained and transported between Nazi camps, was ultimately
dismissed under a different provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. In a statement just as
applicable to the status of intranational takings as it was to the case's ultimate result, the court began the
opinion by observing that "the bounds of [courts'] jurisdiction are not coterminous with the moral force
of [pilaintiffs' claims." 592 F. Supp. 2d at 545.
Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the InternationalTrade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 368
51.
(1982); see also Bauer, supra note 13, at 704 (noting that while "UNESCO's efforts to safeguard
heritage are substantial, they must necessarily operate on the level of the nation-state, and can do little to
secure trans- or sub-national minority rights"); Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposalfor Protecting the
"Cultural" and "Property" Aspects of CulturalProperty Under InternationalLaw, 16 FoRDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1033, 1040-42 (1993); Halina Nieci6wna, Sovereign Rights to Cultural Property, 4 POLISH Y.B.
INT'L L. 239, 246 (1971) ("In practice .. . the concern to preserve cultural heritage and protect it against
threats to diminish it, remains today almost exclusively within the sphere of municipal law."); Vrdoljak,
supra note 4, at 386-87 ("it is the State which defines what cultural heritage is to be protected and it is
the State that must primarily fulfil obligations pertaining to its protection.... Consequently, it is the
importance of cultural heritage to the nation-state which has been privileged by international law.").
52. See MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 178 (identifying the 1970 UNESCO Convention
as the "most influential and most widely adopted" international legislation in the field).
53.
1970 UNESCO Convention, supranote 7, pmbl. (emphasis added).
54. Id. art. 4.
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property "specifically designated by each State." 55 This allows individual
states to act as the final arbiters of what will be deemed their cultural
property. 56 Likewise, it is the state that employs measures for that property's
protection, 57 and it is removal from state territory that triggers enforcement
procedures.58 Even the most cursory review of the 1970 UNESCO Convention
reveals that "[t]he 'State' and its 'national' 59 culture, laws, institutions and
enforcement regimes permeate every aspect.,
Subsequent international efforts have continued to employ the state as
the gatekeeper of its territorial cultural property interests. The 1972 World
Heritage Convention establishes a World Heritage Committee to consider a
state party's request for international assistance, but only on application of the
territorial state. 60 That instrument also allows for the creation of a World
Heritage List, but depends on states to do the cataloguing for their respective
territories. 61 It specifically indicates that "inclusion of a property in the World
Heritage List requires the consent of the State concerned., 62 The same statecentricity marks the UNESCO Inter-governmental Committee for Promoting
the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in
Case of Illicit Appropriation. Established in 1978 in order to return cultural
property to formerly colonized peoples, the Statute of the Intergovernmental
Committee speaks only in terms of "country of origin 63 and stipulates that
only member states of UNESCO can make claims. 64 Finally, the 1995
International Institute on the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, while creating
an individual cause of action for return of stolen cultural property, is limited to
international transactions. 65 It creates no rights for subnational entities vis-Avis their own governments.
In short, while many may conceive cultural property as the "cultural
heritage of all mankind,, 66 the substance of positive international law reveals
55. Id. art. 1;see Mastalir, supra note 51, at 1042 ("Not only do states designate what items
are cultural property... but they are the only entities competent to do so.").
56. For a survey of various state approaches to defining cultural property, see PROTr &
O'KEEFE, supranote 2.
57.
1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, arts. 5, 14.

58.

Id.
arts. 5(a), 6.

59.

VRDOLJAK, supranote 11, at 209.

60. Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage arts. 19, 21,
Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151. For a lengthier discussion of the centrality of the state
in this convention, see M. Catherine Vernon, Note, Common CulturalProperty: The Search for Rights
of Protective Intervention, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 435, 468-71 (1994).
61.
1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, art. 11(3).
62. Id.
63. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 11,at 214.
64.
U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Statutes of the Intergovernmental
Committee for Promotingthe Return of CulturalProperty to Its Countries of Origin or Its Restitution in
Case of Illicit Appropriation,art. 3(2), UNESCO Doc. CLT/CH/INS-2005/21 (Oct. 2005).
65. UNDIROIT Convention, supra note 7, art. l(a). UNIDROIT, otherwise known as the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, is an independent intergovernmental
organization currently consisting of sixty-three member states. See UNIDROIT: An Overview,
http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cftn?dsmid= 103284 (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
66. The term was originally used in the preamble to the Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954
Hague Convention].
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a distinctly nationalist stance. 67 This internationalist-nationalist dichotomy has
been copiously explored elsewhere, and I will not dwell on it here.68 For the
purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to observe that international law has
historically granted the state a monopoly of authority over how and when to
invoke cultural property rights on behalf of its own nationals.
C.

The Emergence of a Transnational Norm Against Intentional
Destruction

This, at least, was the state of affairs through roughly the year 2000.
However, within the past decade, developments in the law concerning
intentional destruction have challenged the totality of the state monopoly over
its own cultural property. As a result of the case law of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the worldwide
condemnation of the Taliban's destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, and the
ensuing 2003 UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of
Cultural Heritage, nonstate actors are emerging as rights holders in cultural
property on the international stage.
Each of these sources of law is briefly examined below, followed by a
survey of scholarly reaction. Throughout, I attempt to highlight the interests
that international intervention has endeavored to protect. My focus is not so
much on whether a norm has attained the status of customary international law
(though I note where such customary law has been found) as it is on the
underlying values that the norm ostensibly vindicates.
1.

ICTY Case Law

Responding to the ethnic cleansing occurring during the warfare in the
Balkans, the U.N. Security Council established the ICTY in 1993.69 The ICTY
statute lists several crimes against property, including wanton destruction or
devastation not justified by military necessity, plunder of public or private
property, and seizure or destruction of cultural property 70 Implicated by these
provisions were attacks on numerous religious and cultural sites, such as the
World Heritage Site of Dubrovnik, the Neretva Bridge in Mostar, the

67. Cf Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of Destroying Cultural
Heritage During Peacetime, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 183, 192 (2003) ("Preservation advocates speak in
terms of the 'common heritage,' but the responsibilities are not common at all. The country hosting the
property necessarily bears the cost for its preservation and maintenance because of its location.").
68. The terms "cultural nationalism" and "cultural internationalism" were first developed by
John Henry Merryman in his seminal article, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property. Briefly,
the former prioritizes repatriation to states of origin, while the latter prioritizes preservation and access
for all humanity, regardless of location. John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural
Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1986).
69.
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. Annex, U.N. Doc. S/827
(1993).
70. Id. art. 3(b)-(e).
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Jasenovac memorial complex in Croatia, and the library of Sarajevo. 7 This
destruction of cultural property as part of the attempted destruction of a
people's cultural past
has led to several convictions under the ICTY statute's
72
provisions.
property
The Tribunal in these cases asserted the need for protection of cultural
property based on its importance to nonstate groups. In 2001, the ICTY held
in the Kordi6 & (erkez case that a state's deliberate destruction of the cultural
institutions of particular political, racial or religious groups was a crime
against humanity as defined in Article 5(h) of the ICTY statute.7 3 The trial
chamber explained that the targeting of mosques in Bosnia and Herzegovina
"amounts to an attack on the very religious identity of a people. As such, it
manifests a nearly pure expression of the notion of 'crimes against humanity,'
for all humanity is indeed injured by the destruction of a unique religious
culture and its concomitant cultural objects.", 74 Furthermore, the Tribunal
proclaimed that such destruction was also a criminal violation of customary
international law. 75 Three years later, the ICTY held in the Joki case that "the
crime of destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to
religion, charity, education, and the arts and sciences, and to historic
monuments and works of art and science ...represents a violation of values
especially protected by the international community." 76 The Tribunal's
appellate chamber has also upheld the finding that destruction of cultural
property can supply the requisite mens rea for conviction of the crime of
genocide.
Each of these findings of individual criminal responsibility rejects a
state-centric definition of cultural property. It was the identity of a people, not
necessarily coterminous with the identity of the state, that elevated protection
of such property to the status of a fundamental right. In reaching these
conclusions, the ICTY implicitly recognized subnational actors as primary
benefactors of the international law of cultural property-in wartime and
peacetime alike. As Ana Filipa Vrdoljak has commented, the ICTY
jurisprudence "reiterates the link increasingly being recognised by
international law between cultural heritage and the enjoyment by a group or
community of their human rights." 78 Cognized as a fundamental right of
groups and communities, the prohibition of deliberate destruction imposes
limits on the pure discretion of state actors to dispose of cultural property on
their territory as they see fit.

71.
See Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict: The
Practiceof the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 14 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 1, 12(2001).
72. See Patty Gerstenblith, From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of
CulturalHeritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century,37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 245, 269-71 (2006).
73.
Prosecutor v. Kordid & t(erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 1207 (Feb. 26, 2001).
74. Id.
75. Id 206.
76. Prosecutor v. Jokid, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, T 46 (Mar. 18, 2004).
77. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment in the Appeals Chamber, 1 239
(Apr. 19, 2004).
78. Vrdoljak, supranote 4, at 391.
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2.

The Destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas

This same denunciation of state-centricity underlies the international
response to the Taliban's destruction of two monumental Buddhist statues,
known as the Bamiyan Buddhas, in 2001 .79 The Bamiyan Buddhas, built at
some point between the fifth and seventh centuries, were both well over onehundred feet tall and carved in relief directly out of the rock in the Bamiyan
cliffs in central Afghanistan. 8 ) The religious and cultural significance of the
statues was immense. Bamiyan was a monastic center through the eleventh
century, and dozens of caves dotting the cliffs around the statues had provided
a home to Buddhist monks. 8 1 As a result, the site became an important
pilgrimage destination. The statues themselves reflected major shifts in
Buddhism, indicative of the then-growing view of the Buddha as a
transcendent being rather than simply a revered mortal. 82Art historians
especially valued the statues because they
83 fused stylistic elements of Central
Asian, Hellenistic, and Indian traditions.
Already by the late 1990s, the international community had begun to
express concern for Afghan cultural property under the religious extremism of
the Taliban regime. The World Heritage Committee unanimously adopted a
resolution in 1998 inviting Afghan authorities to take appropriate measures to
safeguard its cultural heritage and calling on the international community to
assist. 84 Curators in the national museum, along with more moderate members
of the Taliban, begged colleagues outside of Afghanistan to accept many of
the museum's treasures for safekeeping. 85 But the Bamiyan Buddhas loomed
largest in international concern. Because of the uniqueness of the Buddhas'
monumental scale as well as their clues regarding the development and
growth of Buddhism throughout Asia, observers from around the world
saw
86
any potential harm to the statues as nothing less than "catastrophic."
Fears for the statues' safety were soon realized. On February 26, 2001,
Mullah Mohammad Omar, Supreme Ruler of the Taliban, proclaimed that all
statues in Afghanistan be demolished pursuant to a fatwah.87 The Taliban
insisted that the edict, allegedly an imperative to prevent idol-worship and
dl-osi
89
88eaiv
therefore compelled by shari ah law, was strictly an internal matter.
79. For a thorough survey of the factual events surrounding the destruction of the statues, see
Wangkeo, supranote 67, at 244-51.
80. Holland Cotter, Buddhas of Bamiyan: Keys to Asian History, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at
A3.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.

UNESCO, Report of the XXI Session of the World Heritage Committee,

VII.58,

UNESCO Doc. WHC-97/CONF.208/17 (Feb. 27, 1998).
85.
See Carla Power, Saving the Antiquities, NEWSWEEK, May 14, 2001, available at
http://www.newsweek.con/id/79377.
86. Cotter, supra note 80.
87. Pre-Islam Idols Being Broken Under Decree by Afghans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at
A9. Afatwah is an interpretation of Islamic law.
88. Molly Moore, Afghanistan's Antiquities Under Assault, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2001, at A 1.
But see Wangkeo, supra note 67, at 252-53 (arguing that this interpretation of shari "ah law was
disingenuous).
89.
Taliban FM Rejects UN Plea To Stop Destruction of Buddhas, AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE,
Mar. 11, 2001.
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Nevertheless, over one hundred individual states registered protest, including
threats of diplomatic sanctions in some cases. 90 The U.N. General Assembly
quickly adopted a resolution, supported by over ninety delegates, calling on
the Taliban to immediately act "to prevent the further destruction of the

irreplaceable relics, monuments or artefacts of the cultural heritage of
Afghanistan." 91In addition, UNESCO, the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the G8 decried
the proposed destruction as a violation of international law. 92 Muslim nations
such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran interceded directly on behalf of the
world community. 93 Several states and private organizations offered to
purchase the statues (Sri Lanka in particular offered to purchase the remains
of any demolished statues in order to reconstruct them), only to be ignored
or rebuffed. Responding to Iran's offer, the Afghan foreign minister explained
that "Afghanistan and Iran are two Islamic countries, and Islam says one
95
Muslim should not give to another Muslim what he does not want to have."
Despite the international pressure, the Taliban went forward with its plan and
dynamited the Buddhas. 96 Squads systematically destroyed not only the
famous statues in the cliffs, but also crates full of ancient Buddhist and
Gandharan artwork and statuary in the National Museum of Kabul.97
Significant for my purposes here is not the Taliban's defiance of what
seemed to be an international proscription, but the fact that that proscription
was issued under the banner of cultural property law. As I discussed above, a
state's destruction of cultural property on its own territory violates no existing
treaty obligation.98 And unlike the destruction of cultural property during the
war in the Balkans that the ICTY would eventually use as the basis for
criminal convictions, the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas did not occur in
the midst of an armed conflict. 99 There were no allegations of genocide or

90. For a detailed account of the specific reactions of each state, see Wangkeo, supra note 67,
at 246 nn.488-517. For a complete chronology of international efforts, see UNESCO, Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, UNESCO Doc. WHC2001/CONF.205/10 (Aug. 17, 2001).
91.
The Destruction of Relics and Monuments in Afghanistan, G.A. Res. 55/243, 3, U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/243 (Mar. 9, 2001).
92. See Wangkeo, supra note 67, at 248-49 & nn.522-26. One notable example is the
statement of Walter Schwimmer, Secretary General of the Council of Europe: "No political or religious
power has the right to deliberately destroy cultural property that belongs to humankind." Sami Zubeiri,
UNESCO Envoy Starts Mission To Save Afghan Heritage,AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 3, 2001.
93.
Wangkeo, supra note 67, at 249.
94. Sri Lanka Bids To Rebuild Bamiyan Buddha Statues from Rubble, AGENCE-FRANCE
PRESSE, Mar. 18, 2001.

95.
96.
97.

Taleban Reject Iran's Offer To Buy Statues, BBC INT'L REP., Mar. 4, 2001.
See Norman Hammond, Cultural Terrorism, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2001, at A22.
Celestine Bohlen, Cultural Salvage in Wake of Afghan War, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at

El.
98. One plausible source of obligation might have been the World Heritage List, but
Afghanistan had exclusive authority for cataloging its own cultural property on the list and had chosen
not to include the Bamiyan Buddhas. But see Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The
Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and InternationalLaw, 14 EuR. J.INT'L L. 619, 631 (2003)
(arguing that membership in the World Heritage Convention obliges states parties to conserve and
protect their own cultural properties even if these are not inscribed in the World Heritage List).
99. See Roger O'Keefe, World CulturalHeritageObligations to the InternationalCommunity
as a Whole?, 53 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 189, 195 (2004); see also Bohlen, supra note 97 (quoting a
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crimes against humanity. Under traditional principles of state sovereignty, the
Taliban was entitled to administer the property within100its own territory as it
deemed appropriate, presumably including destruction.
Instead, condemnation of the Taliban's acts was swift and virtually
universal. 10 1 U.N. delegates invoked the spirit (if not the letter) of the 1954
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, denouncing the destruction as an attack on the common
heritage of mankind, 102 a phrase used in the discourse of international law to
signify assets beyond the limits of territorial sovereignty. 10 3 The "common
of all delegates supporting a U.N.
heritage" trope typified the statements
1 °4
resolution against the Taliban.
In positing a norm that circumscribed the territorial state's discretion, the
General Assembly claimed an interest that overrode the state's traditionally
exclusive authority over its own cultural property. Some might question
whether this rebuke of the Taliban truly represents an indication of
international consensus on the substantive issue of cultural heritage, rather
than just a politically driven campaign against an easy target. I am
UNESCO official's statement that "[t]he problem in the case of Bamiyan was that this was a decision
taken with a cool head, not in the fire of war").
100. This account of state sovereignty is somewhat of an oversimplification. Despite the
Taliban's exercise of de facto rule in Afghanistan, neither the United Nations nor the vast majority of its
members recognized it as the legitimate government; they recognized instead the exiled government of
Burhannudin Rabbani. Nevertheless, the nonrecognition of the Taliban would not significantly diminish
the immunity that it would have traditionally enjoyed vis-A-vis the international community for activity
conducted within Afghanistan's borders. Whichever the rightful regime, Afghanistan remains a
sovereign state. As a result, absent a violation of international law, the Taliban would at worst have had
to answer to the Rabbani government, not to foreign states. Moreover, the proposition that the act of
nonrecognition ipso facto divests a government of sovereignty over the territory it governs is dubious.
See Louis HENKiN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 15-16 (1995) ("An entity that is a state

in fact is a state in law. A rrgime that is a government in fact is a government in law. A very different
question is whether other governments must establish relations with a new state or a new regime.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 cmt. b (1987)
("Formal recognition of a government, like formal recognition of a state, is not mandatory, but there is a
duty to treat as the government a regime that is the government in fact .... Treating a regime as a
government includes accepting its acts as creating international rights and obligations; it does not require
according to the regime other prerogatives commonly accorded to recognized governments, for example
the right to sue in domestic courts.").
101. The delegate from the Ukraine used the starkest terms, describing the destruction as a
"flagrant violation of international law." U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 94th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc.
A/55/PV.94 (Mar. 9, 2001).
102. See Wangkeo, supra note 67, at 258.
103. The preamble to the 1954 Hague Convention referred to cultural property as "the cultural
heritage of all mankind." See supra note 66. The precise formulation "common heritage of mankind"
was first used by the U.N. General Assembly in 1970 in its Declaration of Principles Governing the SeaBed and Ocean Floor, G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2749 (Dec. 17, 1970), and later
codified in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 136, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. It has also been used to describe outer space, G.A. Res. 34/68, art. 11(1),
U.N. Doc. AIRES/34/68 (Dec. 5, 1979), and the environment, G.A. Res. 43/53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53
(Dec. 6, 1988). For more on the link between the two terms, see SHARON A. WILLIAMS, THE
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE

STUDY 57-62 (1978); Merryman, supra note 68, at 841 n.35.
104. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 94th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.94 (Mar. 9, 2001)
(statement of Yukio Satoh, delegate from Japan); id. at 10 (statement of Hadi Nejad Hosseinian,
delegate from Iran); id. at 8 (statement of Luis Raul Estevez Lopez, delegate from Guatemala). For a
more thorough analysis of the statements of the various delegates, see Wangkeo, supra note 67, at 257
nn.612-15.
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sympathetic to the claim that this, like any major event in international
lawmaking, needs to be understood in its political context. 10 5 Notwithstanding
those generalized concerns, the considerable international efforts to
reconstruct the Buddhas would seem to indicate genuine regard for the vitality
of cultural heritage. 106 Moreover, it bears noting that prior to the destruction of
the Buddhas, other cases of destruction committed by less polarizing nations
had prompted negative, if not damning, responses.' 0 7 So while I do not deny
that the destruction of the Buddhas is a politically charged data point, I am
skeptical that the sweeping outcry against the Taliban can be reduced to a
campaign borne merely of political convenience. The more plausible position
is that it is part of a growing opinio juris as to the merits of the physical
preservation of cultural property.
3.

The 2003 UNESCO Declaration

At its first meeting following the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas,
the General Conference of UNESCO convened to adopt a resolution entitled
1°8
Acts Constituting "a Crime Against the Common Heritage of Humanity.
After calling on all member states to ratify all relevant cultural property
conventions, 09 the resolution concluded by requesting the Director-General of
UNESCO to draft the Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of
Cultural Heritage. 1 Over the ensuing two years, draft versions of such a
declaration were prepared, designed "to prevent and prohibit the intentional
destruction of cultural heritage ...in time of peace and in event of armed

conflict.""' On October 17, 2003, UNESCO
member states adopted the final
2
version of the Declaration by consensus."
While literally applicable to cultural property located on any territory,
the Declaration targets a state's treatment of cultural property located within
its own borders. As Federico Lenzerini has observed, creating a legal
instrument to govern states' destruction of the property located within a
separate sovereign territory would be superfluous; basic principles of
105.

See, e.g., ANDREW T. GuzMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKs: A RATIONAL CHOICE

THEORY 217 (2008) ("[lIntemational law has the potential to influence state behavior, but always does
so in a political context."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The ConstitutionalPower To InterpretInternational
Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1804 (2009) (positing that "international law is simply the continuation of
international politics by other means").
106. See Carlotta Gall, From Ruins of Afghan Buddhas, a History Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
2006, at Al.
107. See, for example, the international reactions to Turkey's recent attempt to construct its
llisu Dam over an archaeological site and Romania's destruction of its architectural heritage in the
1970s and 1980s, both of which are discussed in Wangkeo, supra note 67, at 215, 228.
108. UNESCO, Acts Constituting "a Crime Against the Common Heritage of Humanity,"
UNESCO Doc. 31C/46 (Sept. 12, 2001).
109. Id. 1.
110. Id 4.
111. UNESCO, Draft Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural
Heritage,UNESCO Doc. 32C/25 (July 17, 2003).
112. UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage,
http://unesdoc.unesco-org/images/0013/001331/133171 e.pdf#page=68 (Oct. 17, 2003) [hereinafter 2003
UNESCO Declaration]. For a brief history of the drafting process, see Federico Lenzerini, The UNESCO
Declaration Concerning the IntentionalDestruction of Cultural Heritage:One Step Forwardand Two
Steps Back, 13 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 131 (2003).
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territorial sovereignty already provide an adequate shield against such
invasions. " 3 The Declaration's new contribution is, rather, its claim that those
same principles would not shield a state when the property in question resides
within its own borders.
The preamble of the Declaration carefully frames the value of cultural
property in terms of both transnational and subnational interests. As to the
former, the first recital states that "the tragic destruction of the Buddhas
of Bamiyan ... affected the international community as a whole." ' 4 The
Declaration thus opens with its most basic justification for the international
pressure that was brought to bear on the Taliban's sovereign jurisdictionnamely, the property interests of the world community. The potential for
global harm validates incursion into ostensibly domestic allocations of
cultural property. At the subnational level, the fifth recital states that "cultural
heritage is an important component of the cultural identity of communities,
groups and individuals, and of social cohesion, so that its intentional
destruction may have adverse consequences on human dignity and human
rights.""' 5 Like the world at large, subnational communities appear as rights
holders in cultural property. The shift away from state-centricity is thus
bidirectional, reflecting broader transnational interests at the same time as it
reflects more finely grained communal ones. The common undercurrent to
these two emphases is the suggestion that the state no longer acts as the sole
cognizable steward of the cultural property on its territory. The universe of
interested parties is too great to allow the state unfettered discretion.
Providing these normative aspirations with their positive underpinning is
Article VI's principle of state responsibility.1 6 Article VI establishes that a
[s]tate that intentionally destroys or intentionally fails to take appropriate measures to
prohibit, prevent, stop, and punish any intentional destruction of cultural heritage of great
importance for humanity, whether or not it is inscribed on a list maintained by UNESCO
or another international organization, bears
7 the responsibility for such destruction, to the
extent provided for by international law."1

This provision, essentially codifying the sentiment expressed in the worldwide
response to the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, buttresses the position
adopted in the ICTY case law that transnational norms may in some instances
cabin states' discretion over disposal of cultural property. Far from exercising
total monopolies over territorial cultural property, states still possess legal
responsibilities to the international community. Moreover, by stipulating that
those responsibilities concern property beyond that delineated in statenominated inventory lists," 8 the Declaration diminishes the state's ability to
act as a gatekeeper over what shall and shall not be treated as cultural
property.
Several commentators have downplayed the import of the 2003
113. See Lenzerini, supranote 112, at 141.
114. 2003 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 112, pmbl.
115. Id.
116. See Lenzerini, supra note 112, at 142 (referring to Articles VI and VII as "undoubtedly the
most significant provisions of the Declaration").
117. 2003 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 112, art. VI.
118. See supra Section II.B.
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UNESCO Declaration.' 9 It is, after all, a nonbinding commitment that does
not independently form the basis of a legal obligation. 20 Standing alone, it
creates no new positive rights or liabilities under international law the same
way a formal treaty obligation or U.N. Security Council resolution would.
Indeed, not only the instrument's status but also its very language, relying
heavily on aspirational uses of the word "should," seems to compel a narrow
reading.' 2' Arguably, then, the Declaration is at best purely hortatory, and at
worst suggestive that "the main preoccupation of most of the negotiators was
to preserve their domestic interests rather than to produce an instrument
having the effective scope of safeguarding
a value belonging to the
12
international community as a whole."'
Yet regardless of how much binding weight one is inclined to ascribe to
the Declaration, it still reveals the overwhelming extent to which the world
community is asserting an interest in heretofore domestic affairs concerning
preservation of cultural property. Whether or not a tribunal could invoke the
instrument as grounds for liability is, while significant, a separate
consideration.
4.

Scholars' Observations

Surveying all of these recent developments, a number of scholars have
now claimed that a new positive norm has emerged constricting states'
authority to willfully damage cultural property located on their own territory.
For example, Francesco Francioni argues that
cultural rights of individuals, groups and of humanity as a whole are [now] guaranteed
not only in inter-state relations, as in the case of international conflicts, but also in
relation to purely domestic situations where
the issue of the protection of cultural heritage
23
arises within the territory of the State.'

119. See Lenzerini, supra note 112, at 145 (describing the Declaration as "a rather slight
document" that "even falls short of reflecting current practice, construing all the relevant State
obligations as feeble duties"); O'Keefe, supra note 99, at 204 n. 105 (arguing that the draft version of the
Declaration was not intended to assert a customary prohibition on the peacetime destruction of cultural
heritage); Vrdoljak, supra note 4,at 380 (arguing that the Declaration exemplifies states' reluctance to
create new legal obligations).
120. The extent to which facially nonbinding commitments can give rise to binding obligations
remains controversial. See, e.g., Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International
Instruments, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 787, 794-800 (1986); Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in
the InternationalLegal System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 21 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); A HardLook at Soft Law, 82 AM.

SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 371 (1988) (panel discussion on the nature of soft law); Prosper Weil, Towards
Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983).
121. See, e.g., 2003 UNESCO Declaration, supranote 112, art. III, para. I ("States should take
all appropriate measures to prevent, avoid, stop and suppress acts of intentional destruction of cultural
heritage, wherever such heritage is located."); see also Lenzerini, supra note 112, at 141 (commenting
on the Declaration's aspirational language).
122. See Lenzerini, supra note 112, at 141. But see Francioni, supra note 16, at 1219 (arguing
that the Declaration's timing, directly in response to the universally condemned destruction of the
Bamiyan Buddhas, together with its universal adoption by the UNESCO General Conference render it
"a particularly relevant indicator of the sense of obligation that wilful destruction of cultural heritage,
whether in armed conflict or in peacetime, may entail State responsibility and individual criminal
liability").
123. Francioni, supra note 16, at 1214.
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He concludes that "under appropriate circumstances, cultural heritage in the
territory of any State may be considered an element of the general interest of
as such, it must be protected even against
the international community, and, 124
the wishes of the territorial State."'
Similarly, Lenzerini has argued that, notwithstanding the weak language
of the 2003 UNESCO Declaration, there exists "a general opinio juris on the
binding character of the prohibition of acts of deliberate destruction of cultural
heritage of major value for humanity."' 125 This is the product of a "global
perception of the objective intrinsic value of cultural heritage, which
transcends any kind of 'private' power, both individual property or national
sovereignty, in view of the need to safeguard the collective interest to its
preservation."' 126 Given these developments,
[t]he management by a State of a cultural asset of significant value which is located in its
territory has.., emerged from the area of domestic jurisdiction and has been raised to the
level of 'common concern of mankind,' founded in the concept of erga omnes
1 27
obligations, which safeguard the interests of the international community as a whole.

As an erga omnes norm, the duty to safeguard cultural property against
destruction is part of a select group of obligations justified by the public
states.' 28
interest rather than as reciprocal commitments between individual
This status subjects otherwise domestic activity to the scrutiny of any other
state, and indeed, the entire world.
Vrdoljak has adopted a more measured position. Like both Francioni and
Lenzerini, she finds significance in the shift toward recognition of subnational
group interests in the text of the 2003 UNESCO Declaration. 129 That
instrument combined with the ICTY case law "reflect the increasing
recognition by the international community that it must act when forces
hostile to a group seek the 'irretrievable disappearance' of its cultural
manifestations;"' 130 both are a testament to a broader trend toward international
protection of the rights of minorities and indigenous groups.' 3 1 Vrdoljak links
this transnational concern for group rights to the environmental law principle
of intergenerational equity as affirmed by UNESCO, whereby the world owes
124.
125.
126.
127.
Framework

Id. at 1220.
Lenzerini, supra note 112, at 134.
Idat134n.15.
Id. at 144 (quoting United Nations Conference on Environment and Development:
Convention on Climate Change, Apr. 30-May 9, 1992, Report of the Intergovernmental

Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change on the Work of the Second

Part of Its Fifth Session, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (May 9, 1992)); see also Francioni & Lenzerini,
supra note 98, at 633-34 (elaborating further on an erga omnes norm against willful destruction of
cultural heritage).
128. See Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5) (holding that when rights are sufficiently important, "all States can be held to
have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes").
129. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 11, at 271 (contrasting recent UNESCO instruments with the
state-centricity of the 1970 UNESCO Convention); Vrdoljak, supra note 4, at 389-90, 395 (same).
130. Vrdoljak, supra note 4, at 379. The phrase "irretrievable disappearance" refers to Walter
Benjamin's statement that "every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its
own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably." Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of
History, in WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS 253, 256 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans.,
Schocken Books 1988) (1968).
131. Vrdoljak, supra note 4, at 395.
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individual communities the ability to hand cultural goods down to future
generations. 132 At the same time, she points to the tentative language in both
sources as evidence that any steps taken are invariably being taken "reticently
and reluctantly,"'' 33 and notes that the drafting history of the Declaration itself
refers to uncertainties as to whether the norm against destruction of cultural
property has yet attained customary status.134 She therefore avoids Francioni's
and Lenzerini's bolder claims regarding the clarity of opinio juris and erga
omnes obligations, instead characterizing the developments to date as
important albeit preliminary steps toward crystallization of transnational
norms.
Of all the commentators to consider the issue, O'Keefe is the most
skeptical. Concentrating on the reaction to the destruction of the Bamiyan
Buddhas, O'Keefe finds many of the U.N. delegates' statements of rebuke
purely rhetorical, rather than indicative of binding customary norms. 135 Had
the United Nations or any of its delegates truly intended to establish a rule of
law concerning cultural property located on the territory of the acting state,
they would have used the talismanic term "obligation," rather than "need" or
"responsibility." ' 136 The references to cultural property as the common heritage
of mankind might suggest an obligation "by way of corollary," but ultimately
fail to give rise to the requisite opinio juris to support customary norms
1 37
capable of binding states.
And yet even O'Keefe acknowledges that the international reaction to
the Bamiyan Buddhas' destruction, if not generating new customary law, has
still effectively rebutted the traditional presumption of state-centricity in
cultural property administration. At a minimum, the episode demonstrates that
as a matter of general international law, neither condemnation nor diplomatic
attempts at prevention are impermissible interferences into a state's domestic
affairs. 138 A state that threatens the safety of cultural property located on its
own territory is thus no longer entitled to the protections of domestic
jurisdiction under Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter. 139 The right of the
international community to voice protest concerning intranational destruction
of cultural property, according to O'Keefe, is the true customary norm to arise
out of the history of the Bamiyan Buddhas-whether or not the offending
state has any corresponding obligation to the international community.
D.

Taking Stock

The common denominator between these various interpretations is that
preservation of cultural property is a far cry from an exclusively domestic
132.
133.

Id. at 389.
Id. at 396.

134.

Id. at 384 (citing UNESCO, Draft Declaration Concerningthe InternationalDestruction

of CulturalHeritage, Annex II,
135.

9, UNESCO Doc. 32C/25 (July 17, 2003)).

O'Keefe, supra note 99, at 203-05.

136. Id. at 204. O'Keefe notes that the only state to explicitly accuse the Taliban of a violation
of international law was Ukraine, and even Ukraine added an ambiguous rider. Id
137. Id at205.
138.

Id.

139. Id. at 206.
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concern. 140 At a minimum, existing norms empower the international
community to condemn intentional destruction of cultural property even if
located within the sovereign territory of the acting state. At a maximum, those
norms proscribe the intentional destruction itself. The state's monopoly of
authority over its own cultural property, at least insofar as it might have
encompassed the right to destroy, is no longer absolute.
But what lessons might this offer in situations in which a state's critical
decision is not over cultural property's physical preservation, but rather its
geographical allocation? Up until this point, I have referred to the erosion of
state-centricity in cultural property law, but have drawn solely from the law
governing intentional destruction. None of the preceding instruments, case
law, or secondary literature has ever extended a restriction on territorial
sovereignty beyond the point compelled by the imperative to preserve cultural
objects against physical destruction. And yet intranational cultural property
disputes, as I have defined them here, never turn on the issue of physical
safety, but rather on the meaning of repatriation. Not whether property shall
endure, but where. How, then, does the rise of a norm against intentional
destruction illuminate the international community's stake in nondestructive
distribution?
I suggest two answers. First and most basically, it validates the inquiry.
The admission that the law of cultural property has anything to say about
objects already located within a host state's own territory is the threshold
determination without which the rest of this investigation is foreclosed. Before
the developments outlined in this Part elevated the cultural property interests
of subnational groups to a place of worldwide concern, the reach of
international law stopped at the borders of the host-state, except in the limited
case of armed conflict. Now, subnational and transnational interests are more
intertwined; international protection of cultural property is no longer primarily
justified in the name of universal knowledge, but also because of its
importance to local communities and cultural diversity. 141 Subnational
interests, in other words, fuel transnational ones. That move invites critical
assessment of internal allotment of cultural property. To be sure, that
assessment remains unprecedented, but its novelty cannot be said to lie in the
challenge to a state's domestic jurisdiction over its own cultural property-the
law of intentional destruction has already torn that fence down. It lies, instead,
in the scope of that challenge, a question of when rather than if.
Second, the norm against intentional destruction provides guidance as to
what ought to trigger international concern. Some of the same societal
investments that were threatened by the intentional destruction of cultural
property in the Balkans and Afghanistan may be similarly threatened by
nondestructive activity. The offending act that elicited such universal
condemnation was not only physical damage, but also the harm to cultural and

140. Cf sources cited supra note 51 (describing the traditional, state-centric power structure of
multilateral cultural property treaties).
141. See Vrdoljak, supra note 4, at 389 (discussing the changing rationale behind international
initiatives).
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religious diversity that such persecutory destruction caused. 142 The destruction
of Dubrovnik and the bombing of Bamiyan merited international scrutiny
because they were targeted attacks against the cultural manifestations of
unpopular religious and ethnic groups, and as such sounded in the law of
minority rights. 43 That suggests that intranational cultural property conflicts
are especially likely to implicate transnational norms when discriminatory
intent is present and cultural diversity is likely to suffer as a result. As we
shall see, promotion of multiculturalism is a growing trend in its own right
within the recent initiatives of the U.N. General Assembly and UNESCO. 144
For now, it suffices to say that the law governing intentional destruction
demonstrates that same priority.
III.

A DEFAULT RULE OF FOREIGN NONINTERVENTION

Against this backdrop, I now move from calls against intranational
destruction to calls for intranational repatriation. I first propose that
intranational disputes over the allocation of cultural property should be subject
to a default rule of nonintervention. In the average case, committing these
decisions to the discretion of national and local governments would not hurt
the societal interests that the norm against intentional destruction aims to
protect. On the contrary, I argue, there are a host of reasons why international
involvement in these cases would do far more harm than good. The
international community would therefore be better off staying on the sidelines.
In order to provide an example of an intranational conflict where this
default rule should apply, Section III.A describes a dispute over the proper
location within Scotland for antiquities discovered in one region of the
country but currently housed in another. Then, drawing on this example,
Section III.B offers several justifications for letting disputes like this remain
domestic matters.
A.

Case: The Saint Ninian 's Isle Treasure

Saint Ninian's Isle is a small, now uninhabited island in the Shetland
archipelago, some two hundred miles off the northeast coast of Scotland. It is
connected by a small causeway to Mainland Shetland, the largest island in the
archipelago and home to its greatest population.145 The island's namesake is
Ninian, a Christian missionary who founded a church in southern Scotland in
397 C.E. and the subject of a series of church inscriptions at locations
extending northward across the country as far as the Shetland Islands.146 The
most famous of these inscriptions was on Saint Ninian's Isle, but the church
142. See Wangkeo, supra note 67, at 264-66 (distinguishing between destruction motivated by
iconoclasm, which violates customary norms, and destruction motivated by the need for economic
development, which does not).
143. See id at 258-59 (describing view of many U.N. delegates that the destruction of the
Buddhas was an impermissible act of religious intolerance); supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text
(describing ICTY's focus on discriminatory intent).
144. See infra Subsection IV.B.I.
145. Alan Small, The Site: Its History and Excavation, in 1 ST. NIN1AN'S ISLE AND ITS
TREASURE I, 1(Alan Small, Charles Thomas & David M. Wilson eds., 1973).
146. A.C. O'Dell et al., The St Ninian 's Isle Silver Hoard, 33 ANTIQUITY 241,241 (1959).
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itself was destroyed at some point in the mid-eighteenth century. Following its
destruction, the exact
location of the church had been buried beneath the sands
147
and lost over time.
In 1955, a team from Aberdeen University began excavating a site on
the island where local tradition had indicated the building once stood. They
eventually discovered the twelfth-century building's remains. 148 While its
purpose was only to find the remains of the church in order to pinpoint its
layout and date of construction, 149 in July 1958 the team made a discovery far
more momentous. A local fifteen-year-old volunteer found that beneath a
sandstone slab in the nave of the church ruins lay a treasure trove that would
quickly come to be known as the Saint Ninian's Isle Treasure' 50 The trove
consisted of twenty-eight pieces of ornamented silver, including bowls,
brooches, collars, and chafes from sword scabbards, as well as a cryptic
porpoise jawbone. 151
Archaeologists considered the find to be monumental. The artifacts
presented a rare blend of stylistic elements from Ireland, Pictland,
Northumbria, Mercia, and England. 152 Many believed they would also reveal
new information on the fate of the Celtic peoples who had inhabited the
Shetland Islands before Norse settlement. 53 One went so far as to call
' 54 the
treasure "the most important single discovery in Scottish archaeology."'
To many Shetlanders, however, the Saint Ninian's Isle Treasure is
better remembered not as a product of serendipity but an object of
dispossession. After the discovery, the trove was delivered to the British
Museum laboratories for treatment and then displayed briefly at the Marischal
College Museum in Aberdeen with the consent of the private party on whose
land the trove had been found. 55 But soon after its arrival at Aberdeen, the
Lord Advocate 156 brought an action on behalf of the Crown to declare the
trove to be government property, invoking the maxim quod nullius est fit
domini Regis-that is, portable items without an owner belong to the
Crown. 157 The government argued that because the treasure lacked any
identifiable owner at the time of discovery, it automatically escheated to the
government under the Scottish common law of treasure trove. 58 The Court of
147. Id.
148. Id.at 242; Small, supra note 145, at 4.
149. Small, supranote 145, at 4.
150. David M. Wilson, The Treasure, in ST. NINIAN'S ISLE AND ITS TREASURE, supra note 145,
at 45, 45; Ryan Taylor, St Ninian's Isle Treasure Is Home Again After 41 Years, SHETLAND TIMES, July
4, 2008, available at http://www.shetlandtimes.co.uk/2008/07/04/st-ninian's-isle-treasure-is-home
-again-after-41 -years.
151. See generally Wilson, supra note 150 (describing the treasure in detail). Scholars have
subsequently had difficulty determining the precise origins of the treasure. For theories, see id.at 14547.
152. Id.at 144-45.
153. See O'Dell etal., supra note 146, at 268.
154. Id.at 262.
155. Wilson, supra note 150, at 46.
156. The Lord Advocate is the chief legal officer of the Scottish government.
157. T.B. Smith, The Law Relating to the Treasure, in ST. NINIAN'S ISLE AND ITS TREASURE,
supra note 145, at 149, 149.
158. Id.at 149-50. For a more general discussion of the Scottish law of treasure trove,
including the St. Ninian's Isle Treasure, see Carey Miller & Alison Sheridan, Treasure Trove in Scots
Law, 1 ART, ANTIQUITY & L. 393 (1996).
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Session found for the Crown and ordered the University of Aberdeen to
relinquish the treasure. i5 9
Though the national government had been declared legal custodian of
the Saint Ninian's Isle Treasure, the Shetland community still hoped that
construction of the area's first museum, to be located in the regional capital of
Lerwick, would convince authorities to return it to the community for public
display.' 60 But in May of 1965, the government determined that the artifacts'
national significance dictated that they be placed in a national museum, and so
deposited them at the National Museum of Antiquities of Scotland (now
known as the National Museum of Scotland), located in Edinburgh., 61 After a
two-month dispute with the University of Aberdeen, which was still housing
the treasure at the time, the treasure was finally delivered to Edinburgh in
July. 162 This decision to house the treasure in the national capital spurred
immense protest in the Shetlands. 163 Public outcry would continue
unsuccessfully for the next forty years. Other than a three-month tour in 1967
that brought the treasure to a newly opened Shetland museum, it remained in
Edinburgh.164
The campaign for the return of the treasure intensified in the late 1990s.
In 1996, a local playwright staged an original production criticizing the
decision to house the objects in Edinburgh, featuring a fictionalized ending in
which local Shetlanders successfully thwart "outsiders" in Edinburgh and
London who scheme to take the treasure away. 165 By 1997, with the
devolution movement promising Scotland a parliament independent from
Westminster, the expectation of a Member of Parliament (MP) representing
the Shetlands raised hopes even further. 66 The Shetland Movement, a Scottish
political party seeking greater autonomy for the region, became one of the
most vocal contributors to the campaign.' 67 In 1999, a number of Scottish
cultural institutions, including the Museum of Scotland, convened a
symposium to determine when and if artifacts like the Saint Ninian's Isle
Treasure should be handed back to their local communities. 168 Yet the
symposium did not seem to give the issue any further traction.
159. Lord Advocate v. Univ. of Aberdeen & Budge, (1963) S.C. 533 (Scot.). For a thorough
discussion of the legal arguments in this case, which also functions as a historical primer on fifteenthcentury Scottish-Norse relations, see Smith, supra note 157. For a more succinct account, see Lawrence
Fellows, Celtic TreasureIs Won by Crown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1962, at 3.
160. Uproarover TreasureIs 'Stramash' to Scots, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1965, at C3.
161. St. Ninian's Treasurefor Edinburgh, TIMES (London), June 1, 1965, at 14; Uproarover
Treasure Is 'Stramash' to Scots, supra note 160.
162. Uproarover TreasureIs 'Stramash'to Scots, supra note 160.
163. See Sarah-Kate Templeton, Museums Battle To Claim Back Ancient Treasures, SUNDAY
HERALD (Glasgow), Oct. 31, 1999, at 6.

164. See Frank Urquhart, Savedfrom Vikings--and Boundfor Home, SCOTSMAN, July 1, 2008,
at 15.

165. Mike Grundon, Bertie and the Treasure Trove, Garrison Theatre, Lerwick, HERALD
(Glasgow), Aug. 5, 1996, at 14; Treasure Tale Kicks Off Theatre Season, HERALD (Glasgow), Aug. 5,
1996, at 7.
166. See Ken Smith, Destiny of Treasure May Lie with Stone's Example, HERALD (Glasgow),
Aug. 20, 1997, at 1.
167. Id.
168. Templeton, supra note 163. Materials can be found at SCOTTISH MUSEUMS COUNCIL,
OWNERSHIP AND ACCESS: WHO CARES FOR SCOTLAND'S
SYMPOSIUM ON SATURDAY 13 NOVEMBER 1999 (1999).
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The real breakthrough would come a decade later, after the 2007
completion of a new Shetland Museum facility that was better equipped to
house delicate artifacts than its predecessor. 69 Only a few days after the new
museum opened its doors, Alistair Carmichael, the MP for Shetland and
Orkney in the U.K. Parliament, began heavily pressuring the National
Museum of Scotland to return the treasure.170 An initial attempt to compel the
return received "cross-party support from 20 MPs." 171Local politicians
continued to insist that the only plausible justification for keeping the artifacts
in Edinburgh, a lack of appropriate facilities, was now moot. 172 Finally, in
February 2008, the National Museum of Scotland agreed to loan the treasure
to the Shetland Museum for display from July to September of that year.' 73 It
would be the first time the artifacts had been displayed there since their brief
visit in 1967. Though the treasure returned to Edinburgh following the fourhopes have been renewed that the permanent
month stay in Shetland, local
1 74
return may yet be attainable.'
In the fifty years since the Saint Ninian's Isle Treasure was first
discovered, Shetlanders have advanced several rationales for returning the
artifacts closer to the spot where they were unearthed. First, most claim that
the artifacts will be better appreciated in their local context. 175 Typical of this
attitude is the position of the curator of the Shetland Museum:
There's greater significance placed on them where they were found. You can place them
in their cultural context in Shetland. People can actually go and see the treasure, to the
sites and other relevant sites. It makes it more relevant for them.
"If you're having important items of national significance removed from the collection,
76
then effectively you're not showing the complete picture of Shetland's history."'

The attitude that cultural property possesses heightened significance and
meaning within communities of origin functions as a localized version of what
John Henry Merryman has referred to at the state level as cultural
nationalism.' 77 In an intranational context such as this, however, it is perhaps
better thought of as cultural regionalism. From a cultural regionalist
perspective, the additional significance that springs from the proximity
between an object and its original location does not plateau at the national
border. On the contrary, it continues to grow asymptotically as the object
approaches the precise spot of its creation, or, in this case, discovery. Cultural
169. See Frank Urquhart, Shetland History Is Coming Home To Help Illuminate the Past,
SCOTSMAN, May 29, 2007, at 17; Mike Wade, 4.9M Grant Could Return Isle Treasure to Shetland,
SCOTSMAN, Feb. 6, 2002, available at http://living.scotsman.com/features/49m-grant-could-retum-

Isle.2300397.jp.
170. Catherine Macleod, MPs Back Lerwick Museum's Bid To House St Ninian 's Isle Treasure,
HERALD (London), June 6, 2007, available at http://www.heraldscotland.com/mps-back-lerwickmuseum-s-bid-for-st-ninian-s-isle-treasure- 1.842459.
171. MP's TreasureIsland Campaign, DAILY MAIL (London), June 7, 2007, at SCI.
172. Pleafor Museum To Return Treasure, ABERDEEN PRESS & J., July 2, 2007, at 7.
173. Pictish Work Is Offto Shetland,EVENING NEWS (Edinburgh), Feb. 22, 2008, at 20.
174. Taylor, supra note 150.
175. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 166 ("'Its [sic] simply a case of seeing them in a correct
context, and that means keeping them where they were found."').
176. Dawn Thompson, Museum Pieces, ABERDEEN PRESS & J., Apr. 10, 2000.
177. Merryman, supra note 68.
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regionalism thus continues the work of cultural nationalism by further
granularizing the concept of local context and, indeed, the notion of home
itself. To state that the Saint Ninian's Isle Treasure belongs in Scotland
without going further is to operate at too high a level of generality. It is to
supply only the country name on the postal address; in order for the property
to reach its proper destination, more specificity is needed.
Second, many claim that the treasure is effectively lost amidst the vast
holdings of the national museum, drowned out by the immense collection at
best and literally locked away at worst. 178 In this vein, Douglas Coutts, the
child who discovered the treasure during the excavation, recently lamented
that Edinburgh had confined the treasure to "a basement" and "behind some
stairs so you wouldn't notice it unless you were looking for it.' 179 Likewise,
the assistant curator of the Shetland Museum argued that the National
Museum "ha[s] many other silver treasures, which means that the St Ninian's
material loses its impact. People are confronted by so much of it. ' 8 The head
curator made the same point using blunter terms, arguing that "it's a
deplorable way that it's displayed. The items are stuck up on the wall in three
small cases in a dark corner." 81 A smaller, local setting would thus be better
equipped to assure the treasure the focus and attention it deserves.
Third, some view the government's original lawsuit as an elaborate
charade amounting to simple theft, despite the court's holding that the
government was the legal owner to begin with. Shetland Movement
Councillor Billy Stove told newspapers that "[a]s far as I'm concerned, [the
treasures] were robbed from us and they should be returned."' 182 Similarly, a
local journalist remarked with apparent cynicism that the treasure had been
"filched by our mighty cultural institutions." 183 From this perspective,
returning the treasure to the Shetland community would right a prior wrong.
B.

Analysis: Proposinga Default Rule

Derek Fincham, a professor of art law and blogger on cultural property
policy, observed in early 2008 that "[t]he [Saint Ninian's Isle court] case
presented interesting legal questions for Scots property law, but from a
cultural property policy perspective, the excavation, study and display was a
complete success. The site was professionally excavated, the archaeological
context was recorded, and the treasure is now on public display in
Scotland." 184 Notwithstanding Shetlanders' complaints concerning the
treasure's particular display location within the national museum, this much
seems true. The Scottish government exercised its property rights under the
178. See, e.g., Macleod, supra note 170; MP's Treasure Island Campaign, supra note 171;
Shetland's Treasure Kept Locked Away, ABERDEEN PRESS &J., Feb. 24, 1999, at 3.
179. Taylor, supra note 150.
180. Andrew Collier, The TreasureHunt, SCOTSMAN, Apr. 17, 1998, at 13.
181. Thompson, supra note 176.
182. Smith, supra note 166.
183. Julie Davidson, Counsellor, Counsel Thyself, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Aug. 24, 1997, at
16.
184. Derek Fincham, St. Ninian's Isle Treasure, ILLICIT CULTURAL PROPERTY, Jan. 23, 2008,
http://illicit-cultural-property.blogspot.com/2008/0 1/st-ninians-isle-treasure.html.
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law of treasure trove in order to serve the national public by displaying the
artifacts in a world-class museum, where any visitor could easily have full
access. It allowed archaeologists to explore the site fully and to examine the
objects meticulously. While the firestorm of protest has yet to be
extinguished, its fuel remains no more than the allocation of artifacts to a
national institution whose mission is education and the promotion of
culture. 185 Such behavior hardly appears to be the sort that international
cultural property policy ought to be discouraging.
Seen in this light, it is thus unsurprising that the affair has received little
attention outside of the United Kingdom from either the press or legal
commentators. While a local community may feel aggrieved, there has been
no irretrievable loss of culture such as in scenarios of physical destruction.
Nor has there been any display of the sort of discriminatory intent and
destructive motives that subjected the Taliban to worldwide condemnation
and inculpated the Serbian officers under the law of international tribunals.
Nor, finally, has a group been dispossessed of objects of ritual significance.
All other matters being equal, there seems little reason to intervene when a
state administers its own nationals' cultural property in a manner that
preserves the object's physical integrity, affords easy access to the public, and
allows the object
to contribute to a shared stock of knowledge about a
86
culture's past.'
There are at least two possible objections to this account. First, allowing
metropolitan centers the unconstrained discretion to stockpile a state's cultural
property runs the risk of homogenizing the multiplicity of communal
narratives that are at work within national borders. As Vrdoljak has written
concerning the postcolonial context, "[i]ndependence movements were often
accompanied by claims for the restitution of cultural objects held in imperial
collections, in order to reconstitute and revitalise an autonomous collective
cultural identity.' ' 187 This dynamic is clearly at work in the Shetlands, even
without any colonialist weight hanging from the national government's neck.
A group like the Shetland Movement becomes a lead-advocate for the Saint
Ninian's Isle Treasure's return because it, like many indigenous groups, sees
cultural property as a path to cultural autonomy. It has symbolic value for a
collective that wishes to forge a narrative that diverges from the national one.
If our cultural property policy should be encouraging cultural diversity, there
is no obvious reason why we should not pursue that objective transnationally.
Cultural diversity within the state would seem to be as valuable as cultural
diversity between states.
Second, even if one is inclined to concede that the treasure's display in a
national museum adequately satisfies the goals of cultural property policy, it is
still possible that display in a regional museum would have even further
incremental benefits; telling us how good the status quo is does not tell us how
185. See National Museums Scotland, About Us, http://www.nms.ac.uk/about-us/aboutus.
aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
186. See generally John Henry Merryman, The Nation and the Object, 3 INT'L J. CULTURAL
PROP. 61 (1994) (identifying preservation, truth, and access as the three normative imperatives on which
an ideal cultural property policy would be based).
187. VRDOuAK, supra note 11, at 299.
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much better an alternative still might be. After the construction of Lerwick's
new museum in 2007, there no longer appears to be a plausible argument that
a preservation interest compels the treasure's placement in Edinburgh. And as
that museum's curators argued, the treasure may actually be more educational
in its local context, where observers and scholars can examine it close to the
excavation site and alongside other objects unique to the region. The strongest
argument against a return to the Shetlands remains the question of access; it is
simply unlikely that the number of visitors that passes through the National
Museum of Scotland will ever be approached by the number that ventures as
far as the Shetlands region, let alone its museums. Nevertheless, if
Shetlanders' anecdotal evidence is to be believed, that concern may be offset
by the inability of the national museum to create much visibility for the
treasure. Given limited space, museums with extensive holdings will always
have to relegate certain items, even significant ones, to the back rooms.
Defending the national government's choice on the basis of visibility then
seems an odd move when the artifacts' location renders them practically
undetectable. Assuming equal competence at preservation, placing cultural
property in de facto inaccessible locations within central museums does not
seem to be a more satisfactory policy than placing them in locations of
prominence within more remote institutions. If anything, the artifacts might
even be less accessible in Edinburgh, where all but scholars and the most
dedicated laypersons are likely to miss them entirely. Allocation to a regional
museum would thus arguably preserve the cultural property equally well while
better educating the public and providing better access to those seeking
general edification rather than specifically seeking out these objects in
particular.
Both of these arguments are reasonable ones. They are concerns that
national governments should take seriously, and they may even counsel
against many current state practices. But they are not reasons to
internationalize intranational conflicts. In this Part, I argue that as a default
rule, the status quo of letting these disputes remain domestic matters is
appropriate. To be sure, that status quo is due in large part to the fact that local
conflicts such as this are not likely to generate much publicity abroad. Yet
even if the root of international silence on the dispute is sheer ignorance,
silence remains the normatively justifiable outcome. One could offer generally
applicable reasons to tread cautiously before internationalizing a rule of
law, 88 but these are not the focus of my attention here. Rather, I argue that the
internal logic and practical realities of cultural property law itself demand this
conclusion.
1.

Compliance with Existing Norms

First, a default rule against international involvement would best
comport with current norms, As discussed above, several sources of
international law allow foreign intrusion into domestic cultural property
188. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 132 DAEDALUS
47 (2003); John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should InternationalLaw Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN.
L. REv. 1175 (2007).
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affairs under limited circumstances. Section II.D discussed two particular
factors that heighten the international interest in a state's allocation of its
cultural property: discriminatory intent and harm to cultural diversity. In
situations where neither of these elements is present, however, prevailing
doctrine still places a thumb on the scale for noninvolvement. The baseline in
the international law of cultural property administration remains statecentricity.
As a purely descriptive matter, then, it would be a radical step to
internationalize a norm concerning intranational conflicts over a state's goodfaith efforts to house cultural property in a central location. There is little basis
on which to claim that the accretion of norms against intentional destruction
has had any bearing on a state's nondiscriminatory, publicly accessible
allocation of cultural property within its own borders. To the extent that other
areas of cultural property law provides a window into the international interest
in domestic distributional choices, that interest does not yet favor one side or
another in cases like Saint Ninian's Isle.
2.

Institutional Competence

A default rule of noninvolvement would also keep the international
community out of what may simply amount to regional politics. In some
cases, conflict over the precise location of cultural objects can be better
resolved through appeal to local knowledge than through reliance on
transnational norms. The decisionmakers most competent to assess these
disputes are almost certainly likely to be the ones who are also most familiar
with regional attitudes and idiosyncrasies. 189 This argument, so often invoked
as justification for decentralizing the scope of national authority in favor of
municipal authority, 190 is just as applicable to decentralizing the scope of
international authority in favor of national authority. Universalizing a set of
best practices by invoking them under the mantle of international law would
ignore the "cultural contingency 'of place, time, class, and .

.

. accent' that

imbues every perspective." 191 This is hardly a desirable vehicle for the
promotion of cultural diversity.
Moreover, the allocation of cultural objects invariably involves messy
questions of economic distribution best left to individual states. Opportunities
for tourist dollars play a central role in cultural property disputes at any level,
intranational or international. 192 In 2008, the World Tourism Award was given
to Zawi Hawass, Secretary General of Egypt's Supreme Council on

189. Thus Fincham warns that a domestic resolution would be most appropriate for the Saint
Ninian's Isle Treasure, given Scotland's "surprising degree of local and regional pride which can
sometimes turn heated." Fincham, supra note 184.
190. See, e.g., Lea S. VanderVelde, Local Knowledge, Legal Knowledge, and Zoning Law, 75
IOWA L. REv. 1057 (1990).
191.

Id. at 1059 (quoting CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN

INTERPRETATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 215-16 (1983)).
192. For an extended discussion of the relationship between cultural property and the tourist
industry, see BOB MCKERCHER & HILLARY Du CROS, CULTURAL TOuRISM: THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
TouRIsM AND CULTURAL HERITAGE MANAGEMENT (2002).
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Antiquities. 193 Under his direction, traveling exhibits from Tutankhamun's
tomb have netted Egypt US$100 million over the past five years. 94 In Mexico
and Central America, archaeological sites are creating revenue for
undeveloped communities and providing employment to locals. 195 Many
Afghans, perhaps not surprisingly, have pushed for the
96 rebuilding of the
Bamiyan Buddhas as a way to boost their own economy.1
The Shetland Islands, whose rich archaeological sites provide one of the
area's leading draws for visitors, are no different in this regard. 197 As one
activist who has had success in securing the repatriation of other Scottish
artifacts explained, "'That may be a very commercial viewpoint but in an area
such as where we live, visitors and tourism is very important, and this is
something that we could use if we knew [the artifacts] were going to be here
for a long time."' 198 The reality is that advocates for the return of historical
artifacts may speak of cultural impoverishment, but there is usually also a
strong, often unstated concern for financial impoverishment. International law
is far too clumsy an instrument to deal with such localized economic
contingencies.
3.

CabiningCultural Regionalism

Perhaps most importantly, this default rule would temper an already
obsessive focus on repatriation. The 1970 UNESCO Convention proclaimed
that cultural property's "true value can be appreciated only in relation to the
fullest possible information regarding its origin, history, and traditional
setting."' 199 This assertion of a culture-object bond, the sine qua non of cultural
nationalism, lies at the root of countless repatriation movements and continues
to deliver as much symbolic potency as it did forty years ago. 200 Thus, it is
argued, the Elgin Marbles ought to be returned to Greece because they are "a
bridge to the past; an emotional and cultural link to the achievements of

193. Press Release, World Tourism Awards, 1 th Anniversary of the World Tourism Awards
Honors UNESCO World Heritage Centre and Zahi Hawass (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://whc.
unesco.org/uploads/news/documents/news-465-1 .doc.
194. Daniel Williams, Egypt Relics Chief Pulls in Revenue as He Fights for Nefertiti,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-26/egypt
-relics-chief-pulls-in-revenue-as-he-fights-for-nefertiti.html.
195. Kevin F. Jowers, Comment, Internationaland National Legal Efforts To Protect Cultural
Property: The 1970 UNESCO Convention, the United States, andMexico, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 145, 146
n.6 (2003).
196. See Gall, supra note 106.
197. See Paul J. Lalli, Predating the Pyramids, Ruins of Orkney and Shetland Reflect Rich
Heritageof the Scottish Isles, PrITrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, July 16, 2000, at Fl.
198. See Thompson, supranote 176.
199. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, pmbl.
200. See Merryman, supra note 68, at 850-51 (describing the ways in which, throughout U.S.
policy, "the tide runs strongly against the forces of cultural internationalism"); Naomi Mezey, The
Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 2004, 2011 (2007) (describing cultural
nationalism as "still in its ascendancy"); Jordana Hughes, Note, The Trend TowardLiberal Enforcement
of Repatriation Claims in Cultural PropertyDisputes, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 131, 132 (2000)
(describing the increase in success and frequency of nationalistic repatriation claims since the 1970
UNESCO Convention was adopted).
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[Greece's] ancient forefathers." 20 1 Several states have successfully litigated
against U.S. museums for the return of looted or stolen artifacts under
domestic nationalization statutes inspired by similar motivations. 20 2 Other
governments, museums, and even private individuals are voluntarily returning
cultural property to nations of origin. 20 3 Appiah summarizes the moral force of
repatriation well:
[W]e understand the urge to bring these objects "home."... A Norwegian thinks of the
Norsemen as her ancestors. She wants not just to know what their swords look like but to
stand close to an actual sword, wielded in actual battles, forged by a particular smith.
Some of the heirs to the kingdom of Benin, the people of Southwest Nigeria, want the
bronze their ancestors cast, shaped, handled, wondered at. They would like to wonder
at-if we will not let them touch-that very thing. The connection people feel to cultural
objects that are symbolically theirs, because they were produced from within a world of
meaning 2created
by their ancestors-the connection to art through identity-is
4°
powerful.

Nonetheless, even as the ethos of repatriation has begun to blossom in
interstate relations, a growing number of commentators have begun to tally its
costs. Arguably specious moral claims fuel inefficient allocation of property,
reducing the frequency with which objects of cultural and scholarly value can
find their way to museums or other publicly accessible institutions. 205
Quarantining objects in their nations of origin diminishes our capacity to
relate to fellow human beings in spite of cultural differences.20 6 Propertizing
cultural heritage by assigning it an owner with a right to exclude, like a
copyright holder, constrains the natural and free flow of culture.20 7 It also
fixes culture into a particular mold, treating it as an end product rather than a
generative and dynamic element of human experience. The scope of the
indictment against a presumptive right to repatriation is grand indeed.
All of these gauntlets have already been thrown at the feet of cultural
nationalism even before the "patria" in repatriation becomes any narrower
than the state. And yet, micromanaging repatriation on a city-by-city level
through what I have here referred to as cultural regionalism would only
exacerbate these concerns tenfold. To begin with, it would risk the liquidation
of not only so-called "universal" museums such as the British Museum, 20 9 but
201. Michael J. Reppas 11, The Deflowering of the Parthenon: A Legal and Moral Analysis on
Why the "Elgin Marbles" Must Be Returned to Greece, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
911,944 (1999).
202. See Fabienne D. Struell, CulturalProperty,31 INT'L LAW. 691, 691-93 (1996).
203. See Michael J. Reppas II, Empty "International"Museums' Trophy Cases of Their Looted
Treasures and Return Stolen Property to the Countries of Origin and the Rightful Heirs of Those
Wrongfully Dispossessed,36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 93, 113-19 (2007).
204. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM 134-35 (2006).
205. See Eric A. Posner, The InternationalProtection of Cultural Property: Some Skeptical
Observations, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 213 (2007).
206. See APPtAH, supra note 204, at 130-35.
207. See BROWN, supra note 11, at 212-17; cf LAWRENCE LESSiG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW To LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY, at xiiixvi (2004) (arguing that awarding private parties monopoly control over culture through expansive
intellectual property rights can impede that culture's development).
208. See Mezey, supra note 200, at 2015-18; cf Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1974 (2006) (exploring the concept of generativity).
209. See George Abungu, The Declaration:A ContestedIssue, ICOM NEWS (Int'l Council of
Museums, Paris, Fr.), No. 1, 2004, at 5 ("[l]f large scale repatriation were to take place, then of course
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also national museums that provide a central repository for the cultural
property associated with a specific territory. As the original discoverer of the
Saint Ninian's Isle Treasure himself acknowledged, "[o]f course I would like
it to be in Shetland but if everyone wanted their local treasures in their local
museums then you wouldn't have a national museum. 210 If we were to honor
the morals claims of localities with the same deference as we do those of
states, this must be the endgame. The demise of the national museum is the
logical conclusion of cultural regionalism just as much as the demise of the
universal museum is of cultural nationalism. The practical costs of splintering
museum collections throughout the territory of individual states are plain
enough. It would reduce economies of scale for scholarship and education, as
students, scholars, and members of the general public alike would all have to
travel farther distances to witness or study the art and artifacts of particular
regions. It would also narrow the historical context in which any display could
be presented (imagine, in the case of Saint Ninian's Isle, the curator who
wanted to present the history of the Shetlands side by side with the history of
its neighbors to the south--or the visitor who wanted to better understand it).
One plausible response is that all of this is a slippery-slope fantasy that
is not likely to ever materialize. Surely, one might argue, selective calls for
intranational repatriation pose no meaningful threat to national museums,
whose copious collections would retain value in spite of the occasional
departure of a few minor items. 2 11 Yet the potential for repeated repatriations
to create a sense of entitlement should not be dismissed lightly. The campaign
for the return of the Saint Ninian's Isle Treasure gained considerable
momentum from another intranational repatriation, the transfer of the Stone of
Scone from Westminster to Edinburgh in 1996.212 Shortly after the Stone was
safely ensconced back in Scotland, many began to view it as precedent for
how the conflict over the Saint Ninian Isle's Treasure should be handled. In an
article entitled Destiny of Treasure May Lie with Stone's Example, one
journalist wondered, "[w]ho knows what returning the Stone of Scone might
have started? While many mainland Scots welcomed the return of the Stone to
Edinburgh from Westminster, many Shetlanders are now wondering whether a
Scottish Parliament can do the same for them. "213 More generally, another
observer has argued that the rise of repatriations worldwide proves that
society is "rebelling against the status-quo of de facto museum ownership of
these looted items," giving "an indication that a swing in the pendulum,
favoring the return of these treasures has occurred., 214 Whether or not one
agrees with that assessment, it is at least a far more plausible statement now
many museums would be left with hardly any collections at all."); Dirs. of the Art Inst. of Chi. et al.,
Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Museums, ICOM NEWS (Int'l Council of
Museums, Paris, Fr.), No. 1, 2004, at 4.
210. Taylor, supra note 150.
211. Cf. Abungu, supra note 209, at 5 (referring to the "fear of many museum directors that
they would be left with empty museums or with hardly any collections worth talking about" as
"unnecessary").
212. See Michael White, Stone of Scone's Going Home After 700 Years, GUARDIAN, July 4,
1996, at 3.
213. Smith, supra note 166.
214. Reppas, supra note 203, at 94.
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than it would have been before the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Many
slippery slopes pose real concerns, and it is all too easy to dismiss warnings
against them when one stands at the slope's crest. 215 As attitudes alter and
political momentum accumulates, national museums may be put in the
position of expending resources to justify themselves-much like the British
Museum against its foreign critics-if not returning items to regional
museums outright. This potential for harm to national museums at the very
least counsels against postulating any international norm that would restrict
museums' ability to deal with repatriation requests on a delicate case-by-case
basis.
Beyond its concrete threat to centralized museums, cultural regionalism
is also troubling on a human relational level. Sarah Harding once observed
that "the notion that identity, whether individual or group, must forever
remain attached to a particular object is unsettling. An immutable, intrinsic
connection between identity and property may unduly limit, at least in theory,
an ongoing process of cultural redefinition. ' 2 6 A cultural regionalist approach
to repatriation would only intensify this calcification of cultural identity.
Dependent on a conceptual atomization of an object's "homeland" to an
increasingly subnational level, it not only attaches an object to a group, but
also actively narrows how widely that group may be defined.2 7 As discussed
earlier, the link between the Treasure and Scottish identity is an
overgeneralization as far as Shetlanders seem to be concerned; identity must
be further granularized down to a regional stratum, distinguishing the capital
from the provinces. The smaller that stratum, the more precise the definition
of cultural identity. And the more precise the definition of cultural identity,
the more conformity it demands. It is far easier to brand outliers or dissenters
when the core is crystal clear.
In the cultural context, clarity constrains. Cultural regionalism
unwittingly reminds us that some questions are better left unanswered. Appiah
challenges proponents of repatriation to determine just which "people" it is to
whom the 1954 Hague Convention refers when it proclaims that "each people
makes its contribution to the culture of the world., 21 8 Looking at the Sistine
Chapel, he asks rhetorically whether the people in question would be "[t]he
people of the Papal States? The people of Michelangelo's native Caprese? The
Italians? 2 1 9 There is no right solution. That is his point. The force of his
argument lies in the absurdity of an attempt to devise a definite response;
unregulated cultural identity never remains stable over time. Yet it is just that
question that cultural regionalism purports to answer. Behind the object, it
proclaims, there must be a unit of culture that represents the greatest common
denominator of all possible "peoples" with a legitimate claim of
"contribution" to that object's creation. The answer lies waiting to be
215. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026
(2003); Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage andSlippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155 (2005).
216. Harding, supranote 11, at 752.
217. Madhavi Sunder has made a similar point that legal aids to cultural survival also end up
suppressing cultural dissent. See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 503-04
(2001).
218. APPIAI, supra note 204, at 126 (emphasis removed) (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. Id.
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unearthed through sustained communal reflection, just as the object lies
waiting to be unearthed in the ground. In the Saint Ninian's Isle case,
advocates for repatriation implicitly claim that unit to be the people of the
Shetlands, to the exclusion of the people of the Scottish mainland, In another
case, it might be the people of the Scottish lowlands, to the exclusion of the
Scottish highlands. It might be a province, a city, or even a small group within
a city. 22 But whatever the unit's size, cultural regionalism can always
pinpoint the boundaries to the next decimal point. To call for a norm dictating
intranational repatriation is to call Appiah's bluff.
This argument is not to say that the National Museum of Scotland ought
to refuse to return the Saint Ninian's Isle Treasure to the Shetlands. Indeed, it
is not a prescription for the National Museum of Scotland at all. It is, rather, a
message to the rest of us: let states and their populations settle their own
domestic disputes over cultural property. We have a far larger stake in letting
cultures define themselves organically and fluidly than we will ever have in
locking down the notion of homeland with that extra bit of exactitude. These
conflicts will always be contentious and sometimes even bitter, but the pill of
a default rule in favor of repatriation would be bitterer still. If the world
community has any stake in these disputes, it lies in an affirmative duty to
avoid involvement.
IV. RAISING THE STAKES: DISCRIMINATORY PATRIMONIES AS
ABUSE OF CULTURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Thus far I have argued for a default rule of nonintervention in
intranational cultural property disputes. I now explain why that rule ought to
be only a default. I contend that international scrutiny becomes warranted
where a claimant's assertion of rights would actually frustrate cultural
property law's demonstrated commitment to cultural diversity. Section IV.A
examines a case that directly implicates that commitment. Section IV.B then
lays out the argument that the presence of these concerns alters the calculus
over the propriety of international scrutiny
Before delving into the case's details, it is worth highlighting its
intranational credentials, which may not be self-evident from the narrative.
The case involves a state's expropriation of cultural objects from a group of
its own nationals, followed by that group's immigration to a different state.
The group has since continued to dispute the expropriation from abroad. To be
sure, as a matter of contemporary politics, it would now admittedly be
difficult to classify the dispute as intranational. Yet as a matter of international
law, because foreign sovereign immunity operates retrospectively to the time
220. One fascinating example of cultural regionalism in what might be called an intramunicipal
conflict is the recent dispute over the Adas Yisroel Anshe Meseritz Synagogue, a historic structure
located in New York's Lower East Side. After its congregants determined that part of the building,
already in disrepair, needed to be demolished in order to construct new facilities, a number of
preservation societies stepped in to try and save the landmark. Some of these societies were specifically
affiliated with the Jewish community of the Lower East Side, arguing that the synagogue was part of a
broader narrative of generations of Jewish immigration to the area. See Sewell Chan, Fate of Lower East
Side Shul Stirs Emotions, N.Y. Times: City Room, Aug. 14, 2008, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.
com/2008/08/14/fate-of-lower-east-side-shul-stirs-emotions.
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of the taking, the conflict could easily be confined to domestic jurisdiction.
The legal regime that I discussed in Section H.A would preclude international
intervention, notwithstanding the fact that much of the group had transplanted
itself to another country after the fact. For my purposes here, the following
case is an intranational one in so far as the law imputes it to be.
A.

222
Case: Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Federation

Chabad is a 250-year-old worldwide Chasidic sect, currently based in
Brooklyn. 223 Like other Chasidic groups, Chabad is organized around a
dynastic line of spiritual leaders, each known as a Rebbe. Until the First
World War, the Chabad community remained centered in Belarus (then under
control of imperial Russia). But as the Bolshevik Revolution intensified the
campaign against Jewish religious and cultural identity, Chabad was forced
underground.2 24
In the early 1920s, suspicions arose concerning the involvement of
Yosef Yitzchok Schneerson, the sixth Rebbe, in the illicit promotion of
Judaism in the Soviet Union. Schneerson would spend the next few years on
the run from the secret police before receiving their permission to move to
Leningrad in 1924.225 Eventually the Soviet authorities arrested him and
sentenced him to death. It was only through the intervention of foreign leaders
that Schneerson's life was spared and his sentence commuted to permanent
expulsion.226 Exiled, Schneerson traveled to Riga and then to Warsaw before
securing a visa and finally immigrating to the United States, where he settled
22
in the Crown Heights section of Brooklyn. 227 After most of the Chabad
community perished in Nazi concentration camps, Schneerson reestablished
the center of the movement in Crown Heights, which remains the movement's
home today.
During the First World War, the Fifth Rebbe, Shalom Dov Baer, was
fleeing his home with family and followers as the German army advanced into
221. See infra text accompanying notes 242-246.
222. Some of the general history of the movement presented here is adapted from the
description given in Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Gourary, 650 F. Supp. 1463, 1464
(E.D.N.Y.), af'd, 833 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1987). For additional background, see The Schneerson
Collection and HistoricalJustice: Hearing Before the Comm 'n on Security and Cooperationin Europe,

109th Cong. 37 (2005) [hereinafter Schneerson Hearing] (prepared statement of Rabbi Boruch Shlomo
Cunin, Director, Chabad-Lubavitch); and Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian
Federation,466 F. Supp. 2d 6, 10-14 (D.D.C. 2006), affd in part,rev'd in part,528 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
223. Chasidism is a Jewish spiritual movement founded in the mid-eighteenth century. From its
beginnings, the movement divided itself into several groups centered on local communities and their
individual leaders, the Rebbes, who serve as mediators between the individual, God, and the society
outside the community. For more on the history of Chasidic Judaism, see HARRY M. RABINOWICZ,
HASIDISM: THE MOVEMENT AND ITS MASTERS (1988). For more on Chabad, see AVRUM M. EHRLICH,
LEADERSHIP IN THE HABAD MOVEMENT (2000); and SUE FISHKOFF, THE REBBE'S ARMY: INSIDE THE
WORLD OF CHAB3AD-LUBAVITCH (2003).
224. JONATHAN D. SARNA, AMERICAN JUDAISM 298 (2005).
225. Alter B.Z. Metzger, Prologue to JOSEPH ISAAC SCHNEERSOHN, THE HEROIC STRUGGLE:
THE ARREST AND LIBERATION OF RABBI YOSEF Y. SCHNEERSOHN OF LUBAVITCH IN SOVIET RUSSIA 19,
20-22 (Alter B.Z. Metzger trans., Kehot Publ'n Soc'y 1999) (1928).
226. SARNA, supra note 224, at 298.
227. Id.

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 35: 347

Russian territory. He took with him a portion of a communal library that had
been built up by the preceding four Rebbes, originally dating to 1772. The
complete Library was immense, containing over 12,000 books and 381
manuscripts. Unable to transport such a large volume on his own, Dov Baer
committed the remaining portion of the Library for safekeeping to a
storehouse in Moscow. The Russian Civil War would prevent Dov Baer from
ever returning to collect it. In 1920, the Soviet government transferred the
Library to a state institution. When Schneerson, who had by this point
succeeded his father as the leader of the movement, attempted to retrieve it,
the Soviets refused. It remains disputed whether the government ever formally
nationalized the Library. In any event, Schneerson was forced to leave it
behind when he was exiled.
He did succeed, however, in securing an export license for an archive
comprised of over 25,000 pages of the previous Rebbes' handwritten
teachings, correspondence, and other records, passed down from generation to
generation. These manuscripts were of monumental significance to the
Chabad community. An expert on Chabad would later observe,
the ksovim [writings] that are original manuscripts or manuscripts used by the Rebbe
himself, assume a sanctity about them, that they are kind of the essential legacy. I would
compare it to the crown jewels. It's something concrete that is passed on in a symbolic
way, and in a way incorporates in itself both the sanctity, the very presence, the very
personality of the Rebbe [himself]. 228

Similarly, the Seventh Rebbe would himself remark that "these manuscripts
and books are great religious treasures,
a possession of the nation, which have
229
historical and scientific value."
Though the Chabad community conceived of the Archive and the
Library as a single collection, the two would have very different provenances.
Schneerson took the Archive to Warsaw in 1933, where it would remain until
the outbreak of the Second World War. Unable to bring the Archive with him
to the United States during his flight from the Nazis, he left it behind in
Poland, where it was seized by the Nazis. In 1945, the recently victorious Red
Army took a substantial portion of the Archive as German "trophy
documents" and brought it back to the Russian State Military Archive in
Moscow. 23° The balance of the Archive remained in Poland, which in 1974
returned it to Chabad's headquarters, now located in Brooklyn. The Library,
meanwhile, remained in the Russian State Library throughout the war and on
through the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In the 1990s, after a series of unsuccessful efforts in the Russian
courts, 23 1 Chabad began an intense diplomatic campaign to convince Russia to
return the Collection. Russia would eventually offer to display part of the
Collection at the Moscow Jewish Community Center, but the Chabad
community in the United States adamantly claimed that that solution would be
228. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Gourary, 650 F. Supp. 1463, 1465 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
833 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1987).
229. Id. at 1472.
230. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed'n, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 2006),
affid in part, rev'd in part, 528 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
231. Seeid.atl3-14.
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one of its
insufficient. "The Collection is not a trophy for display,"
' 2 32
representatives explained. "It is a heritage to be returned.
By 2005, members of the Chabad community as well as the U.S.
government had grown frustrated at the failure of diplomatic efforts to secure
the Collection's return. Many made public statements conceming the cultural
and religious significance of the books and manuscripts. Appearing at a
meeting of the congressional Committee on Security and Cooperation in
Europe devoted specifically to the issue, Leon Fuerth, who had previously
negotiated with Russia as Vice President Gore's Assistant for National
Security Affairs, explained that
[t]hese books are sacred, not only because of what they contain, which is a record of a
spiritual struggle to understand the will of God, but they are also sacred because of who
has owned them and spent their lives pouring [sic] over them and has used them to teach
younger generations.

Rabbi Yehuda Krinsky, the former Assistant Chief of Staff to the Seventh
Rebbe, similarly added that "[t]hose raised in the Chabad tradition cherish
these books and manuscripts. To us, their value is not about art and perhaps
not even sanctity. It's about family. These books are like human beings. They
give life to life. 234
Russia, for its part, professed an equal but competing cultural attachment
to the Collection. Citing the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the Russian Ministry
of Culture and Mass Communications explained that "[u]nder the
international law ...this collection is part of Russia [sic] cultural heritage,"
and hence could not be removed from the country pursuant to domestic
inalienability laws.235 While acknowledging the importance of the Collection
to Chabad, the Russian Embassy in Washington insisted that "[t]he Collection
originated in Russia and the USSR, as did the Chassidic movement from
which the Collection springs. It has continuously remained part of the Russian
cultural heritage ever since."' 236 That historical pedigree gave Russia, it
claimed, a national cultural interest in maintaining the Collection within its
borders. The books and manuscripts of the Rebbes, it chided, "belong[] to
,,231
Russia.
Not everyone took these claims at face value. Marshall Grossman, one
of Chabad's attorneys, was incredulous. "National treasure? National treasure
accumulated during the course of some of the most vicious persecution, death
squads and interrogations, including interrogation into imprisonment of the
Lubavitch rebbe. That's a national treasure? Moscow, you have a very strange

232. Schneerson Hearing, supra note 222, at 43 (statement of Rabbi Boruch Shlomo Cunin,
Director, Chabad-Lubavitch).

233. Id. at 1g (statement of Leon Fuerth, Professor, George Washington University).
234. Id.at 19 (statement of Yehuda Krinsky, Former Assistant Chief of Staff to the Lubavitcher
Rebbe).
235. Background Information on Joseph Y. Schneerson 's Collection of Books and Manuscripts,
as Well as Related Problems, in Schneerson Hearing,supra note 222, at 63 (submission by Ministry of
Culture and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation).
236. Material Submittedfor the Record by the Russian Embassy, in Schneerson Hearing,supra
note 222, at 60 (submission by the Russian Embassy).
237. Id at 61.
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way of showing what you consider to be your national treasures."2 38 Some

speculated that Russia was merely making excuses to avoid stating its true
fear-that giving to the West anything that could be construed as a part of the
national patrimony would foment popular backlash.23 9 Whatever the truth may
have been, Russia fastidiously clung to its assertions that the Collection was
Russian cultural property and that the 1970 UNESCO Convention validated
its retention.
Sensing that applying diplomatic pressure was futile, Chabad brought
suit against Russia in a federal district court to regain possession of the
Collection, alleging that the Soviet Union had expropriated it in violation of
international law. 24 Chabad objected to both the Bolshevik seizure of the
Library and the Red Army's declaration of ownership over the Archive. As a
basis for its claim, Chabad emphasized the incredible religious and historical
importance of these texts to the community. 24 It also stressed that its decision
to turn to the U.S. court system was a last resort following decades of
diplomatic and political efforts that were met only with anti-Semitic slurs and
threats of violence.
Russia protested that the texts were an integral part of its own cultural
patrimony and moved to dismiss on several grounds, including foreign
sovereign immunity. Chabad maintained that jurisdiction existed under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's expropriation exception, whereby a
foreign sovereign will not be immunized when rights in property taken in
violation of international law are at issue. 242 Jurisdiction ultimately turned on
whether the expropriations were violations of international law. The critical
question was the nationality of the owners in relation to the expropriating
state; because a sovereign nation's expropriation from its own citizens is not a
violation of international law, the expropriated
owner needed to be an alien
243
national in order for jurisdiction to exist.
The district court held that while the taking of the Archive could form
the basis for a claim in U.S. courts, the taking of the Library could not.2 "
Because the Nazis were the first to confiscate the Archive, the subsequent
Soviet confiscation during and after World War II was clearly unlawful. The
1920 expropriation of the Library, on the other hand, was held not to be a
violation of international law because the owner, the Fifth Rebbe, was then a
national of the taking state.245

On appeal, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Chabad had in fact carried its
238. Schneerson Hearing,supra note 222, at 21 (statement of Marshall B. Grossman); see also
Bradford Wiss, Disclosure:New Facts Foundin Chabad'sQuest for Sacred Texts, CHABAD LUBAVITCH
HEADQUARTERS, July 19, 2005, http://lubavitch.com/news/article/2015100/DISCLOSURE-New-FactsFound-ln-Chabads-Quest-For-Sacred-Texts.html (quoting the skepticism of Chabad's regional director
in Israel).
239. Fuerth conceded that the return of the Collection would probably pose "something of a
political third rail." Schneerson Hearing,supra note 222, at 24 (remark by Leon Fuerth).
240. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed'n, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd
in part,rev'd in part, 528 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
241. Id. at 10-14.
242. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006).
243. Agudas Chasidei Chabad,466 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
244. Id. at 20.
245. Id. at 17.
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jurisdictional burden as to both expropriations. After affirming the district
court's analysis of the Archive's confiscation, it found that Chabad had made
a substantial and nonfrivolous proffer that the true owner of the Library at the
time of expropriation was not a single Soviet citizen but rather the worldwide
religious movement. 246 That preliminary showing that both expropriations
were from alien nationals was enough to confer federal jurisdiction under the
expropriation exception. The D.C. Circuit remanded to the district court to
proceed to the merits of the claim, after which point Russia announced that it
would cease to litigate the matter in the U.S. court system. 247 On October 29,
2009, the district court entered a default
judgment against Russia. 248 The
249
future of the Collection remains unclear.
B.

Analysis: Proposing an Abuse of Cultural Property Rights
Standard

The D.C. Circuit's decision was unquestionably a triumph for the
plaintiffs, who were free to bring their claims for both segments of the
Collection. Yet the case did nothing to dispel the notion that intranational
takings of cultural property are by definition beyond the scope of international
law. A finding that the Library's owner (whether the Chabad community or an
individual Rebbe) was a Soviet national would have committed the dispute to
Russia's exclusive jurisdiction and spelled the end of the matter so far as
international law was concerned. That was precisely the conclusion that the
district court reached, and, but for the geographic happenstance of Chabad
having expanded its communal membership beyond the Soviet border, it
could easily have been affirmed on appeal. Either way, the victims'
nationality conclusively determined whether or not international law had
anything to say.
Even if courts are not yet able to recognize it as a legal matter, however,
the conflict in the Chabad case carries international significance-regardless
of the nationality of the plaintiffs. Rights in cultural property, unlike rights in
any other property, are specifically intended to promote cultural diversity and
respect for different peoples. This is not only suggested by the recent
developments in the law of preservation, discussed above in Section II.D, but
also indicated explicitly in the major international treaties in the field and
several U.N. General Assembly resolutions. Persecution of a group is a direct
assault on this commitment to cultural diversity. To receive the law's
protection in spite of that assault is gross inequity. And to grant that protection
is bad policy. I therefore argue that in such discriminatory circumstances, the
246. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed'n, 528 F.3d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
247. See Jordan Weismann, Chabad Tries Court To Return Rabbis' Books, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REPORT (Atlanta), July 9, 2009, at 8.
248. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed'n, No. 05-01548 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2009)
(order entering default judgment).
249. A Russian ministry has recently introduced draft legislation that would restitute religious
objects nationalized during the Soviet era and currently housed in state institutions. See Pavel Korobov,
PeredachapoZayavkam Sluzhitelie [A TransferRequested by the Clergy], KOMMERSANT, Jan. 14, 2010,
available at http://www.kommersant.n/doc.aspx?docsid=1303083 (Russian) and http://rt.comfTop_
News/Press/eng/2010-01-14/transfers-as-requested-by-religious-ministers.htm
(English). It is not yet
clear whether this legislation would have any effect on the Library or the Archive.
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25
international community has good reason to intervene. 0
This argument proceeds in three parts. First, I explain how the major
instruments of international cultural property law demonstrate the entire legal
regime's commitment to the promotion of multiculturalism. I then contend
that when a state administers its cultural property in such a way that it actually
undermines rather than advances multiculturalism, the international
community has a significant interest in intervening in order to prevent the
legal protections from becoming self-defeating. Finally, I identify the doctrine
of abuse of rights as a mechanism for making normative distinctions between
constructive and destructive cultural property claims.

1.

Multiculturalism in the CurrentInternationalCultural
PropertyRegime

In 1978, Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, Director-General of UNESCO,
issued a statement encouraging a host of international and domestic actors to
aid the repatriation of cultural objects to their countries of origin. 251 In
concluding his call to action, he proclaimed that repatriating cultural property
would help foster nothing less than "the general happiness of mankind.",252 To
M'Bow, the connection between repatriation of cultural property and world
betterment was to be found in the "long dialogue between civilizations which
shapes the history of the world." 253 Cultural property rights deserve
international enforcement because they bolster "international solidarity ....
254
[and] an atmosphere of mutual respect between nations.
Enforcing these rights was, in other words, an expression of
multiculturalism. Multiculturalism has been defined as "aspiring toward 'a
plurality of cultures with [all] members [of society] seeking to live together in
amity and mutual understanding and mutual cooperation, but maintaining
separate cultures."' 255 Multiculturalist policies "protect[] individuals' and
250. Though I focus here on cultural diversity, there is also an argument that the continuing
ritual significance of the items to the religious group alone should merit a different approach. Chabad's
quest for the Collection's return redounds not only to historical justice, but also to the spiritual welfare
of the society. Even a devoted cosmopolitan like Appiah acknowledges that "[i]f an object is central to
the cultural or religious life of a community, there is a human reason for it to find its place back with
them." APPIAH, supra note 204, at 132; see also John Henry Merryman, The Retention of Cultural
Property, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 497 (1988) (distinguishing the Afo-a-Kom, a ritual sculpture
created by a Cameroonian tribe, from most other cultural objects on the grounds that "the culture that
gave the object its cultural significance... [is] alive," and that the object was "actively employed for the
religious or ceremonial or communal purposes for which it was made"). The fact that the community has
since immigrated to the United States, half a world away from the Collection's current home, also
strengthens the case for repatriation.
251. Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, A Pleafor the Return of an IrreplaceableCulturalHeritage to
Those Who CreatedIt,31 MUSEUM 58 (1979).
252. Id
253. Id.
254. Id
255. This formulation belongs to Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law:
Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297, 302 n.29 (1988) (quoting
ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST, ANTHROPOLOGY AND CULTURAL PLURALISM: THREE CASE STUDIES:
AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND USA 3 (1974)). For others discussing the Post/Havighurst definition,
see Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals'
Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1119 (1996); and Jonathan Drimmer, Hate Property:A Substantive
Limitation for America's Cultural Property Laws, 65 TENN. L. REV. 691, 726 (1998). There is an
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groups' freedom to engage in" diverse cultural practices and, in so doing,
"define, preserve, and reinforce group differences through law. ' 256 It was such
protection for group differences that M'Bow was seeking when he spoke of
using repatriation to foster intercultural dialogue and respect.
One might be tempted to explain M'Bow's multiculturalist (to say
nothing of rosy) position purely in light of his affiliation with UNESCO,
whose mandate from the United Nations was in part to "preserv[e] the
257
independence, integrity and fruitful diversity of the cultures" of the world.
It would be intuitive that the leader of UNESCO, which was also charged with
conservation of art and other cultural objects, might simply fuse those two
goals. Yet the ethos of multiculturalism casts a much larger shadow over
258
cultural property rights than UNESCO alone can account for. In fact, that
ethos has marked international cultural property law from its beginnings.
Cultural property, a purely domestic issue until World War I,259 came under
the umbrella of international law because of lawmakers' emerging belief that
preservation of individual cultures promotes a shared sense of pluralistic
community. This attitude has continued to permeate contemporary
discussions; wherever addressed, the creation of cultural property rights is
inevitably linked with a desire to promote intercultural respect and dialogue.
Below, I discuss that link as reflected in both multilateral treaties and U.N.
resolutions.
a.

Multilateral Treaties
i.

The 1954 Hague Convention

The preamble to the 1954 Hague Convention, the first international
treaty concerning cultural property, famously proclaimed that "damage to
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the
cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to
the culture of the world., 260 The Convention is predicated on the assignment
enormous debate on the precise contours of multiculturalism, e.g., Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture":
Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1608-09 (1996)
(responding to Coleman), which is beyond the scope of this Article.
256. Peter H. Schuck, Alien Rumination, 105 YALE L.J. 1963, 1998 (1996) (book review).
257. UNESCO CONST. art. I, § 3.
258. For the best account to date of the relationship between multiculturalism and cultural
property in both U.S. and international law, see Drimmer, supra note 255, at 725-47.
259. Cultural property did attract the interest of international legal bodies earlier in the
twentieth century, but attempts at legislation consistently stalled. See InternationalProtectionof Works
ofArt and HistoricMonuments, in I U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DOCUMENTS AND STATE PAPERS 821, 865-71

(1949). For a historical compendium surveying the development of the international cultural property
framework through the 1980s, see I UNESCO, THE PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY:
COMPENDIUM OF LEGISLATIVE TEXTS (1984). National and regional cultural property regimes, by
contrast, have existed for centuries. See Gael M. Graham, Protection and Reversion of Cultural
Property: Issues of Definition and Justification, 21 INT'L LAW. 755 (1987) (discussing national and
regional attempts to protect cultural property from Middle Ages onward); John Moustakas, Group
Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1179 (1989) (dating
first efforts to protect cultural property to ancient Greece).
260. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 66, pmbl. (emphasis added); see also VRDOLJAK,
supra note 11, at 139 ("The phrase 'cultural heritage of all mankind' within the context of the 1954
Hague Convention cannot and should not be interpreted without its enjoinder-'each people makes its
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of multinational significance to the cultural identity of a single nation. It
formally establishes global multiculturalism as the basis for international
cultural property legislation. Moreover, the Convention's fundamental
requirement-to safeguard the cultural property of signatory nations during
times of war or occupation-has since become a part of customary
international law. 261 That customary law flows directly from the Convention's
professed goal of cultural diversity.
ii.

The 1970 UNESCO and 1995 UNIDROIT
Conventions

The intent to foster multiculturalism has continued to underlie all
subsequent international legislation on cultural property rights. One need look
no further than the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention. 263 These treaties, the two most influential multilateral culturalproperty instruments currently in force,264 grant signatory states the right to
restrict trade of designated items of cultural significance, even if privately
owned. 265 Both the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions brand "illicit" an
import or export that violates any such domestic restriction.266 When cultural
property is illicitly imported into a signatory state, that state is required to
facilitate its recovery and repatriation to its country of origin.267 The treaties
thus subjugate private property interests to national ones. They deny
individual citizens the traditional rights of possession, use,
and alienability
2 68
that are the hallmarks of Western private property regimes.
Both treaties justify their exceptional resort to a group-rights system by
invoking the multiculturalist principle first trumpeted in the Hague
Convention. In its second preambular recital, the 1970 UNESCO Convention
declares "that the interchange of cultural property among nations for
scientific, cultural and educational purposes increases the knowledge of the
civilization of Man, enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires
mutual respect and appreciation among nations. ' ' 69 It states that a depletion of
contribution to the culture of the world'. . . . It reflects . . . the notion of cultural pluralism and the

contribution of every people and their culture to humankind.").
261.

See MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 65 ("[The 1954 Hague Convention's] basic

principles concerning respect for cultural property ha[ve] become part of customary international law.");
David E. Meyer, Note, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and Its Emergence into
CustomaryInternationalLaw, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 349 (1993).

262. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7.
263. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 7.
264. See Drimmer, supra note 255, at 744.
265. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, art. 13; UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 7,
art. 3.
266.

1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, art. 3; UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 7,

pmbl.
267. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, art. 2; UNIDROIT Convention, supra note
7, art. 3.
268. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (stating that an individual's property
rights consist "in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or
diminution, save only by the laws of the land"). The U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed this tripartite
view of property as the rights to "possess, use, and dispose." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
269. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, pmbl.
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one nation's cultural property is an "obstacle to . . . understanding between

nations. 2 70 Likewise, the UNIDROIT Convention refers to "the fundamental
importance of the protection of cultural heritage and of cultural exchanges for
promoting understanding between peoples, and the dissemination of culture
27
for the well-being of humanity and the progress of civilisation." 1
attention because
Preservation of local cultural heritage deserves international
272
that heritage is ultimately "in the interest of all."
iii.

The 2005 UNESCO CulturalDiversity
Convention

UNESCO's clearest indication of cultural property legislation's
multiculturalist valence can arguably be found in the organization's most
recent foray into the field. In 2005, the Thirty-Third UNESCO General
Conference approved its Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Diversity of Cultural Expressions 273 by a vote of 148 to 2.274 The Convention
endeavors to shield local creators of cultural products from free-trade
obligations by granting state signatories the "right to adopt measures and
policies to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions within
their territory. 275 In aspirational terms, it permits signatories to regulate the
influx of foreign cultural goods that might interfere with the flourishing of
domestic ones. As justification, it provides a litany of multiculturalist goals,
including "encourag[ing] dialogue among cultures with a view to ensuring
wider and balanced cultural exchanges in the world in favour of intercultural
respect and a culture of peace', 276 and "foster[ing] interculturality," 277 defined
as "the existence and equitable interaction of diverse cultures and the
shared cultural expressions through dialogue and
possibility of generating
278
mutual respect.,
Though the 2005 UNESCO Convention addresses trade obligations
more directly than property rights per se, there are several reasons why it
should still color international cultural property law. First, it arguably
incorporates previous cultural property treaties. Its preamble harkens back to
270. Id.
271. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 7, pmbl.
272. Id.; see also Drimmer, supra note 255, at 745 (stating that these treaties "recognize the
national and international importance of protecting cultural properties to preserve individual cultural
identities and global diversity").
273. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Oct.
20, 2005, UNESCO Doc. No. CLT-2005/Convention Diversit6-Cult. Rev., available at http://unesdoc.
unesco.org/images/00 14/001429/142919e.pdf [hereinafter 2005 UNESCO Convention].
274. Press Release, UNESCO, General Conference Adopts Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (Oct. 20, 2005), available at http://portal.unesco.org/
en/ev.php-URL ID=30297&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html. The dissenters were
the United States and Israel, whose positions probably had nothing to do with the goal of cultural
diversity per se. See Michael Hahn, A Clash of Cultures? The UNESCO Diversity Convention and
International Trade Law, 9 J. INT'L EcON. L. 515, 548 (2006) (noting the likely consensus on the
imperative to preserve cultural diversity and that "the United States['s] refusal to support the Convention
was not at all based on that point").
275. 2005 UNESCO Convention, supra note 273, art. 2.
276. Id. art. 1(c).
277. Id. art. l(d).
278. Id. art. 4, para. 8.
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the 1970 Convention by "[r]eferring to the provisions of the international
instruments adopted by UNESCO relating to... the exercise of cultural
rights., 279 Furthermore, Article 20 instructs signatories to interpret and apply
previous treaty obligations with the 2005 Convention in mind.28 ° Construed
narrowly, this provision may indicate nothing more than the signatories'
preexisting obligation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
avoid entering into conflicting treaty obligations. 1 But construed more
broadly, it suggests that the "cultural rights" instruments referred to in the
preamble must be understood in light of the undercurrent of cultural diversity.
Second, the Convention's substantive provisions imply a normative claim
regarding the value of cultural property. As Kal Raustiala has noted, the 2005
UNESCO Convention essentially "legitimizes the economic protection and
subsidization of certain producers of cultural property over others., 28 2 This
subsidization is based on the policy calculation that not all cultural property is
created equally; that which fosters a greater diversity of cultural expression is
more precious than that which does not. Third, and most generally, the 2005
UNESCO Convention reinforces the point that multiculturalism is the catalyst
behind cultural exceptionalism in international law. Whether applied to
property rights or trade obligations, the reason we carve out different regimes
for cultural goods is because we see the opportunity for encouraging cultural
diversity.
iv.

The InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social
and CulturalRights

Though dealing with subject matter far broader than tangible property,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 283
(ICESCR) is becoming an important touchstone for the relationship between
cultural heritage and cultural diversity. Article 15 of the ICESCR recognizes a
right "to take part in cultural life."'28 4 As subsequent treaty interpretation has
established, that right depends on a vibrant multiplicity of cultures. The U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the body of
independent experts charged with interpreting and monitoring compliance
with the ICESCR, recently issued a General Comment explaining that "the
concept of culture implies the coexistence of different cultures."28' 5 That
279. Id pmbl. (emphasis omitted).
280. Id. art. 20, para. 1(b).
281. See Hahn, supra note 274, at 540 ("It would be a violation of the good faith obligation
states carry under Art. 26 [of the Vienna Convention] to not to avoid as much as possible to enter into
contradictory obligations and, even more so, to contribute to an actual collision of treaty obligations.").
282. Kal Raustiala, Commentary: Density and Conflict in InternationalIntellectual Property
Law, 40 U.C. DAVis L. RaV. 1021, 1037 (2007). Raustiala's remark is meant as criticism, which I do not
take issue with here. See also Mezey, supra note 200, at 2014 (arguing that the 2005 UNESCO
Convention presents only a "rosy and sanitized view of the conditions of [cultural] contact"). For my
purposes, it suffices to note that the 2005 Convention has something to say about the value of cultural
property.
283. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
284. See id.
art. 15, para. 1(a).
285. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment 21: Right ofEveryone
To Take Part in Cultural Life, 42, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/GC21 (Dec. 21, 2009).
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proposition informs cultural property law, the General Comment continues,
because "the obligations to respect and to protect freedoms, cultural heritage
,286
In detailing parties' legal obligations
and diversity are interconnected."
under the ICESCR, the CESCR has specified that "[c]ultural heritage must be
preserved, developed, enriched and transmitted to future generations as a
record of human experience and aspirations, in order to encourage creativity
in all its diversity and to inspire a genuine dialogue between cultures. ''287 This
conception of cultural property draws its legitimacy not simply from the moral
rights of a state-party claimant, but from the cross-cultural dialogue it fosters.
The CESCR, like UNESCO and UNIDROIT, treats multiculturalism as the
lodestar that is to guide cultural heritage agendas.
b.

U.N. GeneralAssembly Resolutions

General Assembly resolutions offer a further window into the spirit that
These
animates the binding treaties discussed in the previous Subsection.
resolutions have continually treated legislation of cultural property rights as a
multiculturalist enterprise. Following the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the
General Assembly began an annual series of resolutions urging accession to
the Convention and advocating repatriation of cultural property acquired
before the Convention took force. 28 Like all of the treaties discussed above,
these resolutions tied repatriation to multiculturalism. Thus, in a 1972
resolution, the General Assembly expressed fear that "the world may be
impoverished by succumbing to uniformity and monotony in modes of
life.", 290 Repatriating cultural property presented a way to stave off this
impoverishment, a means "for mankind to save the wealth and diversity of its
cultures and to secure the best possible conditions for their further
development., 291 In 1975, the General Assembly declared that "the promotion
of [a] national culture can enhance a people's ability to understand the culture
and civilization of other peoples and thus can have a favourable impact on
286. Id. 50.
287. Id.
288. My focus is on the resolutions' ability to illuminate and reinforce the rationale underlying
the obligations contained in more formal instruments. I take no position here in the expansive debate as
to how much General Assembly resolutions contribute to the actual creation of new legal obligations.
Compare, e.g., Jonathan I. Chamey, Universal InternationalLaw, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. 529, 543-44
(1993), with Oscar M. Garibaldi, The Legal Status of GeneralAssembly Resolutions: Some Conceptual
Observations, 73 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 324, 326 (1979). In any event, the specific obligation

posited in these resolutions-a bright-line duty to repatriate-almost certainly lacks enough consensus
to bind state actors. See James A.R. Nafziger, The New InternationalLegal Frameworkfor the Return,
Restitution or Forfeiture of CulturalProperty, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 789, 806 (1983) (arguing

that, these resolutions notwithstanding, "it is very doubtful that the notion of a right to the return and
restitution of cultural property constitutes a peremptory norm of general international law, from which
no derogation is permitted").
289.

See Graham, supra note 259, at 779-80 (discussing resolutions). For a complete list of

resolutions through 1981, see Return or Restitution of Cultural Property to the Countries of Origin, U.N.
GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/36/L.22/Rev. l/Add.1 (Nov. 27, 1981); Return or Restitution of

Cultural Property to the Countries of Origin, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/36/L.22/Rev. 1 (Nov.
25, 1981); and Return or Restitution of Cultural Property to the Countries of Origin, U.N. GAOR, 36th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/36/L.22 (Nov. 23, 1981).

290. G.A. Res. 3026A (XXVII),
291.

Id. 4.

3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3026 (Dec. 18, 1972).
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international co-operation." 292 These resolutions have continued on a nearly
biennial basis since 1981.293
In 2001, the General Assembly declared 2002 to be the U.N. Year for
Cultural Heritage.294 After invoking the Hague and UNESCO Conventions,
the General Assembly then explained that granting a nation group rights over
its cultural heritage provides "a common ground for the promotion of mutual
understanding and enrichment among cultures and civilizations."
295 It
296
repeated this same language verbatim in a 2003 resolution.
In sum, the United Nations has identified a symbiosis between the two
fields; to argue for group rights in cultural property has been to argue for
multiculturalism, and vice versa. In this respect, it should come as no surprise
that UNESCO, the primary organizational spokesperson on international
cultural property legislation, is also the author of the Universal Declaration
on Cultural Diversity.298 When Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow declared that cultural
property rights ensured respect between nations, 299 he was echoing not only
the mission statement of his organization, but also the voice of the
international community.
2.

Multiculturalism Versus Acts of CulturalIntolerance

If multiculturalism is the purpose of cultural property rights, should we
continue to honor those rights even when doing so would frustrate
multiculturalism rather than advance it? For those interested in cultural
property, this is the central question posed by the Chabad case. And under
current practice, that question has typically been answered in the affirmative.
Neither UNESCO nor UNIDROIT specify different treatment for the
ethnocentrically absolutist or persecutory. Instead, they mandate repatriation
to any nation of origin, regardless of that nation's treatment of other cultures
at home or abroad.300 There is thus a single obligation to repatriate, no matter
whether property was seized from the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto or from the
Nazis who put them there. 30 1 As Jonathan Drimmer has noted, this approach
292. G.A. Res. 3391, 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3391 (Nov. 19, 1975). The identical language was
used in a 1973 resolution concerning restitution of artwork to countries that had been victims of
expropriation. G.A. Res. 3187 (XXVIII), 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3187 (Dec. 18, 1973).
293. The only exception occurred in the three-year gap between the resolutions in 2003 and
2006.
294. G.A. Res. 56/8, 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/8 (Nov. 21, 2001),
295. Id.$3.
296. G.A. Res. 58/124, 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/124 (Dec. 17, 2003).
297. See UNESCO CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. c (designating UNESCO as the U.N. body responsible
for recommending international conventions for "the conservation and protection of the world's
inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science"); MERRYMAN ET AL., supra
note 52, at 178; Jo M. Pasqualucci, When the Quest for CulturalObjects Divides North from South, 89
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 433, 450 (1995) (transcribing statement of Lyndel Prott, former director of
UNESCO's cultural heritage division, that UNESCO "acts as the spokesperson of the international
community" on issues relating to protection of cultural property).
298. UNESCO Res. 25, UNESCO Doc. 31 C/25 (Nov. 2, 2001).
299. See supra notes 251-254 and accompanying text.
300. See Drimmer, supranote 255, at 747.
301. But see Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Art and Atrocity: Cultural Depravity Justifies
CulturalDeprivation, 8 FowHmm INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 699 (1998) (using the doctrine of
civil forfeiture to propose a theory of "cultural forfeiture," under which Nazi Germany's own depravity
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creates a "content-neutral" property regime that
disregards the specific norms and mores of the... group .... By guaranteeing the
promotion of cultural identities on a content-neutral basis, current and proposed laws
appear to operate from a morally relativist perspective wherein all cultures deserve equal
legal protections. These laws thus do not
3 2 substantively limit the availability of their
protections based on a culture's practices. 0

But need this be so? It would not be hard to envision the opposite-a
cultural property regime that did limit the availability of its protection based
on the traits or practices of particular claimants. Such "content-specific"
judgments, to borrow Drimmer's conceptual rubric, should already be quite
familiar from the world of private property. Normative principles inform our
decisions not only concerning what should qualify as a property right, 0 3 but
even concerning who should receive or be denied rights in goods whose status
as property is already established. Critical scrutiny of a claimant's identity,
precisely the sort of content-specificity that Drimmer noted was absent from
cultural property law, is in fact a routine part of allocating private property
rights, at least in the United States. It occurs, for instance, when a
municipality restricts land use to one-family dwellings, 304 a state bar denies
the application for a law license in light of the applicant's character and
fitness, 30 5 or a court withholds a patent due to antitrust concerns. 30 6 In each
case, the state restricts property rights because the potential recipient would
not match a desired profile.
An even more extreme example can be found in Hawaii's Land Reform
Act of 1967. 3 07 In the mid-1960s, the state legislature found that forty-seven
percent of Hawaii's land was concentrated in the hands of only seventy-two
private landowners, and that this concentration of ownership was responsible
for skewing the state's residential fee-simple market, inflating land prices, and
injuring the public tranquility and welfare.30 8 The legislature responded by
passing the Land Reform Act, which created a mechanism for the condemning
deprived the country of any cultural property right in German artwork captured and appropriated by
Russia).
302. Drimmer, supra note 255, at 747-48.
303. Even if it is the product of positivistic rules, any definition of property maintains
normative content so long as those rules are shaped by value judgments at the legislative stage. See
generally Amnon Lehavi, The PropertyPuzzle, 96 GEo. L.J. 1987 (2008) (discussing public institutions'
normative decisionmaking when crafting property rights). Of course, for those that claim that property
rights exist independently from positivist laws, the claim is even stronger.
304. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) ("A quiet place where yards are
wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land use project addressed
to family needs.... The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.").
305. See Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963). Indeed, the U.S.
Supreme Court has found a property interest in licenses for many revenue-producing activities. See, e.g.,
Goldsmith v. U.S. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926) (accountant's license); Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889) (physician's license).
306. See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Profit Neutrality in Licensing: The
Boundary Between Antitrust Law and Patent Law, 8 AM. L. & ECON. R. 476 (2006) (arguing that much
of twentieth-century jurisprudence about acceptable patent licensing can be summarized in normative
principles).
307. Land Reform Act of 1967, HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516 (LexisNexis 2007).
308. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
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of residential tracts and for transferring ownership of the condemned fees
simple from landlords to existing lessees. 30 9 This redistribution of property
rights, which would later be upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, 310 stemmed
from normative considerations concerning the identity of the original
landowners. 311 It was a calculated value judgment about who should and
should not have property rights in the real estate.
Each of the above examples demonstrates that unequal protection can be
perfectly at home in the world of private property. A single family may
acquire rights in a particular piece of land; a group of college students may
not. An honest and law-abiding individual may acquire rights in a law license;
a dishonest or criminal individual may not. A lessee with no prior property
rights in an apartment may acquire them after condemnation; an oligopolistic
landlord may not. And so on. Whether it is through a legislature, a licensing
board, or a court, the state can profile who shall receive legally protectable
property rights and who shall be denied them.
Should cultural property be any different? That this area of law would
avoid these kinds of value judgments certainly has an intuitive appeal. After
all, attaching normative values to particular cultural practices would
seemingly frustrate cultural property's multiculturalist goals. We cannot
effectively commit to cultural diversity if we are in the habit of judging
cultures on their merits.312 It might then be argued that in order to honor the
purpose of cultural property law, we must provide equal protection of the law
to all groups who seek it.
This position resonates with the argument that the Taliban advanced
when it insisted that the fate of the Bamiyan Buddhas was a purely domestic
issue. To the Taliban, the statues were idols. If we intend to respect other
cultures, the argument goes, we ought to defer to the Taliban's prerogative to
eradicate idolatry in its midst.31 3 In the same vein, we ought not to be
awarding cultural property rights based on global mores. If, as the Hague
Convention declares, each people truly makes its contribution to the culture of
the world, then perhaps foreign states have no authority to engage in cultural
309. Id. at 233.
310. Id.
311. As one commentator observed, the Land Reform Act represented "a clear-cut state policy
to carry out an egalitarian-driven reform in Hawaii's land regime." Lehavi, supranote 303, at 2017. This
deliberate focus on the identity of the original landowners, rather than a taking from a random victim
with the bad luck to reside in the wrong place at the wrong time, is what gives this case particular
salience in this discussion. Cf Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (finding economic
development a proper purpose for the exercise of eminent domain where landowners happened to reside
on the property in question).
312. See Drimmer, supra note 255, at 748 (noting that "respect for multiculturalism generally
mandates acceptance of another culture's practices, even those that deviate from beliefs and standards of
conduct accepted by most cultures").
313. The Taliban is hardly the only group in modem history to claim the prerogative to
eradicate ideologically offensive art. In 1792, for example, the French revolutionary government enacted
a law ordering that all "monuments containing traces of feudalism, of whatever nature, that still remain
in churches, or other public places, and even those outside private homes shall, without the slightest
delay, be destroyed by the communes." Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation as a Public Duty: The
Abbi Gr~goire and the Origins of an Idea, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 1142, 1153 (1990) (quoting Proces-verbal
de la legislative, tit. XII, at 212). In this spirit, Diderot famously wrote: "[I]f we love truth more than
fine arts, let us pray God for some iconoclasts." Stanley J. Idzerda, Iconoclasm During the French
Revolution, 60 AM. HIST. REV. 13, 13 (1954) (quoting 3 MAGAZIN ENCYCLOPEDIQUE 52-53 (1795)).

IntranationalCulturalPropertyDisputes

2010]

profiling.
Yet this approach is only consistent with multiculturalism at the most
superficial level. Neutrality is a false promise. At some point, a line must be
drawn around communal practices whose objective is the eradication of other
cultures. Regulating absolutist or eliminationist groups, while formalistically a
substantive judgment on culture, will preserve a greater diversity of cultures
overall.31 4 This idea is codified in Article 4 of the Universal Declaration on
Cultural Diversity, which provides that "no one may invoke cultural diversity
to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit
their scope. ' 15 For a practical application of this maxim, one need only look
to the international response to the Taliban's purported justification for
destroying the Bamiyan Buddhas. It can perhaps be thought of as a "cultural
nuisance" theory: engage in whatever customs or practices you see fit, so long
as they do not directly harm the customs and practices of others.
Seen in this light, cultural profiling would seem not only permissible,
but even mandatory. Otherwise, multiculturalism becomes the altar on which
cultural diversity is sacrificed. Drimmer locates analogous concessions in the
First Amendment context, noting several scholars' contentions that even the
constitutional guarantor of the marketplace of ideas should not extend to hate
speech.3 16 For cultures, as for ideas, we should not promote the silencing of
others under laws designed to encourage diversity. On the contrary, we should
be deterring it.
In order to do so, the legal mechanisms we use to assign cultural
property rights must account for the identity of the particular cultures
asserting ownership. A group that acquires property through persecution of
another group should receive less legal protection of that property than a
group that acquires the property with clean hands. There is a deep inequity in
allowing the patrimony of the culturally intolerant to stamp out the competing
patrimony of the very victims of that intolerance. It would both unjustly
enrich the discriminating group and abuse the legal right on which it relies.
It is here, where the claim of right arises out of acts of deliberate
discrimination meant to suppress group identity, that our interest in
intranational cultural property disputes must intensify. When Russia
persecutes a minority community like Chabad, it corrodes the multiculturalism
that cultural property laws were crafted to promote. 317 For Russia to then
314.

For more on this idea, see Drimmer, supranote 255, at 749-50; and Tanya Evelyn George,

Note, Using Customary InternationalLaw To Identify "Fetishistic" Claims to Cultural Property, 80

N.Y.U. L. REV. 1207, 1232-33 (2005). Cf Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educatingfor
Citizenship, 62 U. Crii. L. REV. 131, 158 (1995) (arguing that cultural neutrality in education curricula is
impossible because neutrality is itself a non-neutral principle).
315. Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 298.
316. Drimmer, supra note 255, at 753-56.
317. It would also likely violate its independent treaty obligations toward its own minority
groups, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, S. ExEC. DOC.
No. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own
language."), as well as the prohibition on discrimination in the exercise of cultural rights, see ICESCR,
supra note 283, art. 2(2); U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment 20: NonDiscriminationin Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC20 (June 10, 2009)
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insist on the very legal protections whose whole theoretical basis it has so
blatantly disregarded is not only impudent, but also dangerous. If the
international community maintains a neutral principle of nonintervention here,
it risks letting the institution of cultural property cannibalize itself. Cases like
this must not be confused with the regionalist disputes discussed in Part III. In
Chabad,it is not so much the meaning of homeland that underlies the dispute,
but the meaning of cultural property itself. Groups pervert the concept when
they intentionally wield it as a weapon to suppress diversity. Divorcing
multiculturalism from the ambit of cultural property thus turns the claim of
right into a sword against itself. This is not a practice to be left to the political
machinery of individual states. The international community must remain
responsible for ensuring that the law does not lose its normative
underpinnings.
3.

Abuse of CulturalPropertyRights

One helpful tool for addressing this frustration of purpose is the
equitable doctrine of abuse of rights.3 18 An abuse of right has been defined as
a "State exercising a right either in a way which impedes the enjoyment by
other States of their own rights or for an end different from that for which the
right was created, to the injury of another State.' 031 9 It is, to use Vaughan
Lowe's term, an "interstitial norm[]," a rule with no primary normative force
of its own, but one that instead "direct[s] the manner in which competing or
conflicting norms that do have their own normativity should interact in
practice." 32 A number of international tribunals, including the International
Court of Justice,' Permanent Court of International Justice,322 and the World
Trade Organization, 323 have invoked the doctrine in adjudications between
states.
Several commentators have argued that the abuse of rights doctrine has
the most work to do in contexts where rights are otherwise least restricted. It
thus has particular utility with regard to states acting within their own
sovereign territory, where they presumably could invoke domestic
jurisdiction.32 4 Where intranational conduct is deemed reprehensible but not
strictly illegal (for example, because there is not yet any consensus that the
("Non-discrimination and equality are fundamental components of international human rights law and
essential to the exercise and enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.").
318. For a recent survey on the abuse of rights doctrine, see Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights:
An OldPrinciple,a NewAge, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389 (2002).
319. Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4, 4

(Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992).
320. Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-making: Are the Method and Characterof Norm
Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 207, 216 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).

321. See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 141-42 (Dec. 18).
322. See Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1929
P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 46, at 167 (Aug. 19).
323. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products(Complaint by the UnitedStates), 158, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
324.

See, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

300-01 (1933); Byers, supra note 318, at 423-24; Richard Plender, The Legal Basis ofInternational
JurisdictionTo Act with Regardto the Internally Displaced,6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 345, 356 (1994).
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conduct is governed by human rights law), abuse of rights doctrine offers a
mechanism for condemnation or proscription. Another criterion for when the
doctrine would be especially appropriate is when common interests not
325
otherwise governed by binding norms are at stake, such as the environment.
As Byers states, "[h]ow states behave within their territories can sometimes
cause disproportionate harm to the particular or common interests of other
states, even if those states are not neighbours. When such instances are not
already governed by more 326
specific principles, abuse of rights could, and
apply."
perhaps already does,
Intranational cultural property claims stemming from persecutory
actions meet both of these conditions. As demonstrated by the Chabad case
and the numerous other U.S. cases on which it relies, 327 the absence of any
positive law governing domestic expropriations seem to leave states free to
allocate cultural property as they so choose. At the same time, there is an
established international interest in cultural property in general, which, like
the environment, is the common heritage of mankind. 32 Russia's sovereign
prerogative over the cultural objects located on its territory seems to clash
head-on with international society's interest in seeing that cultural property
rights serve their intended purpose. In such a situation, Russia's behavior is
best thought of as an abuse of cultural property rights, an injury to diversity
affected "as the result of the sacrifice of an important social ... interest
to a
329

less important, though hitherto legally recognized, individual right."
This is not necessarily to say the doctrine should supply the rule of
decision in Chabad if a court were to now find that the victims were Soviet
nationals after all. While of significant interest to scholars, abuse of rights
remains a murky concept in the case law of international tribunals. Any
330
reliance on it would undoubtedly represent a bold and an unorthodox step.
Nevertheless, it provides a helpful lens for examining how individual states'
cultural property rights might interact with broader interests under prevailing
international law. Simply put, it would allow us to recognize cultural property
rights as rights, albeit rights that can be abused. Even if not used as a
dispositive mechanism, it would afford the international community a means
of making normative distinctions between asserted cultural patrimonies that
are built on mistreatment of local groups and those that are not. Abuse of
rights becomes the doctrinal disaggregator that separates between the merits
of the National Museum of Scotland's claim to the Saint Ninian's Isle
Treasure and the merits of the Russian Federation's to the Chabad Collection.
Presenting the dispute in these terms would go a long way toward clarifying
the purposes of cultural property law and the unacceptability of contravention.
325.
326.
327.
328.

See Byers, supra note 318, at 429 & n.173.
ld. at 429.
See supraSubsection II.A.2.
See supranote 103 and accompanying text.

329.
330.

LAUTERPACHT, supranote 324, at 286.
See IAN BROWNLIE, PUBLIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 445 (7th ed. 2008) ("[Ilt

may be said that the doctrine [of abuse of rights] is a useful agent in the progressive development of the
law, but that, as a general principle, is does not exist in positive law. Indeed it is doubtful if it could be
safely recognized as an ambulatory doctrine, since it would encourage doctrines as to the relativity of
rights and result, outside the judicial forum, in instability.").
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A MIDDLE GROUND

Some may think this is an argument that proves too much. If one is
inclined to accord such weight to acts that undermine multiculturalism, there
is no obvious reason to limit that principle to the intranational context. This
logic seems just as applicable to international cultural property disputes.
Think of Napoleon's looting of conquered territories, which many French
attempted to justify through claims of cultural superiority, 331 and which
yielded the war booty currently lining the display cases in the Louvre.3 32 Or
consider Britain's colonial occupations, whose fruits now reside in the British
Museum. According "discrimination" some talismanic power in cultural
property disputes seems to collapse the argument into the familiar calls to
liquidate every cosmopolitan museum. As Walter Benjamin famously wrote,
"[t]here is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of
barbarism." 333 Why should it matter whether that barbarism occurs within
your own borders or not?
To be sure, the intranationality of a conflict renders it a different creature
as a matter of doctrine. If conducted today, Napoleon's looting would violate
the terms of the 1954 Hague Convention and likely trigger restitution
obligations if the actor were a signatory to either the 1970 UNESCO
Convention or the UNIDROIT Convention. 334 Even if positive law does not
cover the particular manner in which an expropriation occurred (or does not
apply retroactively to the time in which it occurred), the cross-border nature of
the transaction at least renders it easily cognizable to potential rules of
international law going forward. We need not be as concerned about
discrimination in international cultural property disputes because those
disputes avoid the obstacles of domestic jurisdiction discussed in Part II. Yet
this is only a legal distinction, not a moral one. If Russia ought to return the
Collection to Chabad, existing law provides no guide as to whether the Louvre
ought to return its artwork to the victims of the Napoleonic conquests.
I would ultimately argue that the two scenarios are distinguishable, but
for reasons entirely incidental to the nationality of the claimants.
Encyclopedic museums like the Louvre and the British Museum are not
explicitly relying on cultural nationalism to justify their retention of cultural
objects in the same way that Russia is now doing. Indeed, more often than not,
they are trying to rebut nationalism in favor of a competing vision of crosscultural tolerance, an effort at creating, in the words of the director of the
331.

See EDWARD P. ALEXANDER, MUSEUM MASTERS: THEIR MUSEUMS AND THEIR INFLUENCE

89-90 (1983) (quoting a French petition from 1796 supporting Napoleon's spoliation of Italian art on the
grounds that "[t]he French Republic, by its strength and superiority of its enlightenment and its artists, is
the only country in the world which can give a safe home to these masterpieces").
332. See CECIL GOULD, TROPHY OF CONQUEST: THE MUSEE NAPOLEON AND THE CREATION OF
THE LOUvRE 124-28 (1965).
333.

Walter Benjamin, On the Concept of History, in 4 WALTER BENJAMIN: SELECTED

WRITINGS, 1938-1940, at 389, 392 (Howard Erland & Michael W. Jennings eds., Harry Zohn trans.,
2003).
334. See Paige S. Goodwin, Comment, Mapping the Limits of Repatriable CulturalHeritage:A
Case Study of Stolen Flemish Art in French Museums, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 673, 698-701 (2008). The
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British Museum, "a new kind of citizen for the world." 3 Under the
framework I laid out in Part V, this difference is critical because it presents
less of an abuse of rights. Metropolitan museums, whatever else they may be
doing, are not wielding the idea of cultural property so as to turn it against
itself. Moreover, turning to the purported harms to multiculturalism itself, it
would seem that the effects of Soviet anti-Semitism on members of the
modem Chabad community are far less attenuated than the effects of the
Napoleonic conquests on modem-day Italians or Flemings. Part of this is no
doubt temporal. But a large part of it may also be the stronger identity
between Chabad now and Chabad then, versus that of modem European states
and their forbearers. The cultural link from generation to generation seems
more robust when unambiguous ancestry is involved.336
There may be other possible distinctions. 337 Conversely, there may be
international disputes more analogous to the Chabadcase where my analysis
would indeed suggest that repatriation is appropriate in order to avoid an
abuse of cultural property rights. I concede that the multiculturalism theory
does not have an exclusively intranational valence. Abuse-of-rights scrutiny
would turn far more on the extent of the discrimination and the harms to
cultural diversity that result, rather than the particular nationality of the
victims vis-A-vis the aggressors.
There is, however, a different reason why abuse of cultural property
rights is particularly material to intranational conflict. Though it may
sometimes be a relevant, if underappreciated, consideration in traditional
international disputes, it remains one factor among many. Cultural property
scholarship is populated by myriad justifications for worldwide involvement
in a state's repatriation or retention of cultural objects claimed by foreign
entities. For partisans on both sides of the repatriation wars, the international
interest in these conflicts over the cultural heritage of all mankind is well
established. In the domestic context, by contrast, the abusive use of cultural
property rights is not simply a factor, but the linchpin to understanding when
international involvement is called for. As I argued in Part III, the
internationalization of most domestic conflicts over cultural property could
335.
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337. For examples, see supra note 250.
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harm the cultures involved. The abuse-of-rights scenario is the exception.
Only there, where a failure to internationalize would actually create rather
than prevent harm, would worldwide scrutiny truly be warranted.
If threats to cultural diversity are to assume this sort of weight in our
analyses of intranational disputes over cultural property, it is important that
we be able to stake out some middle ground. Not every conflict will be as
clearly driven by regionalism as the Saint Ninian's Isle case or as rife with
persecutory motives as the Chabad case. There will inevitably be some gray
area in between. Take, for example, the ongoing dispute over the rightful
place of the Lindisfarne Gospels, which has pitted London against a
community in the English city of Durham. 338 The Gospels, a 1300-year-old
religious manuscript created on an island off the Northumberland coast and
now residing in the British Library, were confiscated by the Crown when
Henry VIII looted Durham Cathedral some five centuries ago. In recent years,
the Durham community has brought its case to Parliament, campaigning
33
heavily for the return of the Gospels to the region from which they came. W
The British Library nevertheless maintains that the manuscripts are "of
fundamental importance to a heritage that reaches far beyond the region in
which the manuscript was produced. '' 340 On the one hand, the repatriation
claim seems to share all the hallmarks of cultural regionalism that mark the
Saint Ninian's Isle case. We are back to the attempt to define culture and
homeland with ever-increasing degrees of precision. On that score, foreign
states would seem to have no interest in trying to proclaim a moral victor in
the property dispute. But at the same time, Henry VIII's original expropriation
could arguably be construed as part of an attempt to undermine the Catholic
Church. The claim of national patrimony over objects acquired in a
persecutory campaign suggests that perhaps we ought to treat the case more
like Chabad. The case of the Lindisfame Gospels is in this sense just one
demonstration that a patrimony built on a history of intolerance can easily
exist alongside repatriation claims fueled by cultural regionalism. The two are
not mutually exclusive.
The process of determining the international interest in these conflicts
does not lend itself to bright-line rules. Ultimately, one intranational cultural
property dispute may be as distinguishable from another as the Chabad
Collection is from the artwork in the Louvre. The international community
still ought to consider such factors as: the level of attenuation between the
victim group and the modem claimants; whether the deprivation actually
poses a threat to communal chemistry, such as when the item has religious or
ritual significance; whether the claimant group has access to the property; how
exclusively the repatriation claim relies on a cultural regionalist justification;
and how great a threat to multiculturalism would be posed by a current
338. See MICHELLE P. BROwN, THE LINDISFARNE GOSPELS: SOCIETY, SPIRITUALITY, AND THE
SCRIBE 139 (2003) (describing the nascent political movement for repatriation of the Gospels).
339. See, e.g., William Green, Region Has "Good Case" over Gospels, JOURNAL (Newcastle),
June 21, 2008, at 32; Neil McKay & Adrian Peterson, Delicate Talks Begin over Gospels' Return,
JOURNAL (Newcastle), Mar. 14, 2008, availableat http://www.joumallive.co.uk/north-east-news/todaysnews/2008/03/14/delicate-talks-begin-over-gospels-retum-61634-20620902; Michael Tumbull, Free the
Lindisfarne Gospels To Return to Their Home andHeirs, JOURNAL (Newcastle), Dec. 14, 2007, at 5.
340. Green, supra note 339.
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possessor's retention. This would no doubt be a messy, fact-intensive
endeavor. But it is one that must be pursued if we care about maintaining the
link between property right and purpose.
VI.

CONCLUSION

When we're trying to interpret the concept of cultural property, we
ignore at our peril what lawyers, at least, know: property is an institution,
created largely by laws which are best designed by thinking about how they
whose behavior they govern.
can serve the human interests of those
34
-Kwame Anthony Appiah 1
This Article has examined the extent to which the international
community may have a stake in how intranational disputes over cultural
property are settled. In spite of the long history of state-centricity in the
scheme of cultural property administration, recent changes in the law
governing intentional destruction reveal a growing acceptance of global
scrutiny of states' wrongful treatment of the cultural objects located within
their own territories. This development invites inquiry into whether any
international interests are implicated in states' allotment of cultural property
within their own borders, even when physical preservation is not implicated. It
also suggests that discriminatory intent and harm to cultural diversity are
particularly strong normative justifications for internationalizing otherwise
domestic conflicts concerning cultural property.
I have advocated that, as a default, foreign onlookers ought to avoid
intervention in domestic disputes over the allocation of cultural property. In
most cases, allowing national and local governments to handle these decisions
would not hurt the societal interests that the emerging norm against intentional
destruction aims to protect. Moreover, this rule would best comport with
existing international norms, would leave to local politics that which outsiders
are often less competent to adjudicate, and, most importantly, would avoid the
pitfalls of cultural regionalism.
This neutrality is inappropriate, however, when one claimant's asserted
right would actually frustrate the cultural property regime's multiculturalist
goals. To allow a group to lay claim to a cultural object that it acquired
through persecution of minority communities is an abuse of a property right
whose ostensible rationale is to promote cultural diversity. This frustration of
purpose ought to give the international community a significantly higher
interest in ensuring that a claim does not untether the property right from the
theory that justifies its existence. When such a history of persecution is
present, there will inevitably be many fact-specific criteria that ultimately
weigh for or against international involvement. Even so, the first step remains
recognition of cultural property rights as a purposive legal scheme that is
susceptible to abuse.
I have aspired to create not so much a policy blueprint as a window into
how domestic allocation of cultural treasures can affect our shared
341.
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understanding of both the meaning of culture and the property rights that may
attend to it. My objective has been basic: to argue that the significance of
these intranational conflicts, fewer and less publicized than the international
and indigenous claims that gamer headlines, 342 is ultimately far greater than
we have yet acknowledged. We have grown accustomed to associating the
"culture" in cultural property with the state, punctuated only by indigenous
groups' quasi-international claims against the governments on whose territory
they still reside. Because of this, we tend to overlook the challenges that
intranational repatriation disputes pose to core concepts that underlie the
institution of cultural property as a whole. These disputes should remind us
that cultural property rights are not cosmically ordained, but human inventions
capable of serving masters far different from those for whom they were
intended.

342. These topics at least gamer headlines in English. The frequency of intranational disputes
is in all likelihood greater than I am able to portray here. Their intensely local nature would in most
cases keep them out of the international press, making research of conflicts occurring in nonAnglophone countries a difficult task. One example of a case in the foreign-language press is a recent
battle between different dioceses in Spain over medieval church relics, playing on cultural discord
between the regions of Catalonia and Aragon. Though the issue has been discussed in many Spanish
publications, I am not aware of any treatment in English. See, e.g., Roberto Pdrez Zaragoza, Montilla no
quiere devolver a Arag6n los "bienes de la Franja,"pese a la sentencia [Montilla Does Not Wish To
Return to Arag6n the "Goods of the Strip, " Despite a Court Ruling], ABC.ES, July 2, 2008,
http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-02-07-2008/abc/Cultura/montilla-no-quiere-devolver-a-aragonlos-bienes-de-la-franja-pese-a-la-sentencia 1641975249328.html.

